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Abstract 
This thesis investigated the relationship between people's lay conceptions about 
the malleability of personality and their social inferences. In Part 1. a senes of studies 
was conducted to examine how people who subscribe to the belief that personality is 
fixed (entitv theorists) differ fiom people who subscribe to the belief that personaiity is 
malleable (incremental theorists) in their confidence in infemng an individual's standing 
on a certain trait based on knowledge about the individual's standing on another trait 
construct (Le., inter-constmct inferences). Based on a program of research by Dweck, 
Chiu and Hong (1995), we hypothesized that entity theorists would make more confident 
or extreme inferences than would incremental theonsts. This hypothesis was clearly 
borne out only under limited conditions. Participants' theones were related to the 
extremity of their inferences involving only conceptually related, and not unrelated, 
construct pairs. Moreover, participants' theories exhibited temporal instability, and the 
extremity of their inferences was strongly related to their theories only as measured at the 
time of inference. A strict individual-differences approach cannot explain or predict such 
intra-individual variability. 
In Part II, a knowledge-activation perspective was used to illuminate the social- 
cognitive processes underlying intra-individuai variations in states of knowledge and 
confidence in social inferences. Assurning that most people possess some knowledge 
consistent with the notion that personality is fixed (entitv knowledee] and with the notion 
that personality is malleable (incremental knowledee). it was hypothesized that social 
inferences would be made with greater confidence when entity knowledge is more 
accessible than when incremental knowledge is more accessible. Participants' pre- 
existing entity or incrernental knowledge was made temporarily more accessible (or 
primed) in two studies. In one study, participants were exposed to a biography of a 
fictitious character whose personality remained stable (entitv-prime condition) or 
changed a lot (incremental-prime condition) over the course of his lifetime. In another 
study, participants evaluated the meaning of prouerbs consistent with the notion that 
persondity is fixed (entity-prime condition) or with the notion that personality is 
malleable (incremental-m rime condition). As predicted, across both studies, participants 
in the entity-prime condition made more extreme or confident inferences than did 
parîicipants in the incrementai-prime condition. Expressed beliefs about the malleability 
of personality elicited following the pnming manipulations also differed across the two 
conditions in the direction consistent with the prined knowledge. Overall, Part II 
illustrates the value of using a knowledge-activation framework to understand how 
people's lay personality knowledge influences their social inferences. 
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Do friendly people tend to be honest? Do artists tend to be eccentric? How likely 
is a timid person to act assertively? In the course of our daily lives, we sometimes make 
inter-construct inferences, inferring an individual's standing on a certain trait or persona1 
amibute based on knowledge about his or her standing on another trait constnict. Some 
evidence suggests that while people in general are fairly accurate in predicting the 
direction of empirical association between trait constmcts, they tend to overestimate the 
strength of such associations (Koehler, Brenner, Liberman & Tversky, 1996; see also 
Schneider, 1973). In the present research, we are interested in whether some people are 
more likely than are others to perceive trait CO-variations. We set out to examine whether 
and under what conditions individual differences in beliefs about the malleability of 
personality are related to the extremity of inter-constmct inferences. Before describing 
the present studies that address this issue, we briefly review a program of research by 
Dweck and colleagues and explain how their work suggests that individual differences in 
beliefs about the malleability of personality may be linked to inter-individual variations 
in these kind of inferences. 
Background: hnplicit Theones and Trait-focused Social Perception 
Dweck and colleagues (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Dweck, Chiu & Hong, 1995a; 
Dweck, Hong & Chiu, 1993; Levy & Dweck, 1998; Levy, Plaks & Dweck, 1999) have 
identified two imolicit theories of personality '.'- : (1) entitv theorv, the belief that 
personality is fixed, and (2) incremental theory, the belief that personality is malleable. 
lndividuals who hold an entity theory are referred to as entitv theonsts, whereas those 
who hold an incremental theory are referred to as incremental theorists. These 
researchers proposed that an individual's implicit theory about the fixedness versus 
malleability of personality rnay establish an interpretative frarnework for understanding 
the social world and rendering social judgments. 
According to Dweck and colleagues, entity theorists, in viewing personality as a 
set of fixed traits, rnay see the task of person perception as being to judge or diagnose 
underlying traits. This view of personality rnay imply an expectation of high consistency 
in trait-related behavior across situations, and engender a perception of close 
correspondence between traits and their behavioral manifestations. Such perceived 
regularity permits diagnosis of a person's underlying traits even with a small sample of 
behavior. Also, with the view of traits as fixed, diagnosis made at one point in time is 
The focus of this part of the thesis is on people's beliefs about the malleability of personality. It should be 
noted that, according to Dweck and colleagues, individuals need not possess one sweeping belief that cuts 
across al1 domains; they rnay hold different lay beliefs regarding such domains as intelligence and moraiity. 
For instance, some people rnay believe that personality is malleable but intelligence is fixed, and vice versa 
(Dweck et al., I995a). 
' In this thesis. the term implicit theow refers specifically to people's beliefs about the malleability of 
personality, as defined by Dweck and colleagues (Dweck et al., 1995a). It is worth noting that this term has 
been used by other researchers to refer to other lay conceptions about personality. For example, the term 
has been used to refer to people's beliefs about the stabiiity of persona1 attributes over time (M. Ross, 
1989)' and to people's conceptions of relations among personality traits (Schneider, 1973). 
' The implicit theorist depicted by Dweck and colleagues (Dweck et al., 1995a) bears some similarity with 
that described by M. Ross (1989), given that there is a cenain degree of conceptual overlap in the idea of 
"fixedness versus malleability" central to the former and the idea of "stability versus change" fiindamental 
to the latter. Yet, there are differences between the two theoretical formulations. First, while an attribute 
that changes over time is "malleable". an attribute that is stable over time is not necessarily "fixed". Ross' 
implicit theorist possesses an understanding of conditions that facilitate change, even for attributes deemed 
to be rather stable. Secondly, whereas Dweck and colleagues focus on individual differences in implicit 
theories, Ross emphasizes the shared aspects of theories. In Dweck and colleagues' perspective, Person A 
rnay believe that a given attribute is fixed and Person B rnay believe that it is malleable. In Ross* 
perspective, people in general may believe that Attribute X is more stable than Attribute Y (M. Ross, 
1989). 
deemed to hold at a Iater time. Hence. from the standpoint of an entity theorist, trait 
constructs are useful and reliable bases for organizing, understanding, and making 
predictions about the social world (Dweck et al., 1995a; see also Chiu? Hong & Dweck. 
1997; Levy, Stroessner & Dweck, 1998). 
By contrast, incremental theorists, in viewing traits as malleable qualities and 
personality as dynamic, may see the task of person perception as being to understand the 
psychological processes (e.g., goals, emotional states) that mediate behaviors at different 
times and in different contexts. With this view of personality, behaviors are not seen as 
unambiguous manifestations of underl y ing traits. Consequentl y, trait constmcts are not 
accorded with much value in social understanding and predictions (Dweck et al., 1995a; 
see also Chiu et al., 1997; Levy et al., 1998). In short, Dweck and colleagues proposed 
that entity and incremental theorists differ in their relative emphasis on trait constmcts 
versus dynamic psychological processes in their social perception. 
Dweck and colleagues have presented an extensive body of evidence consistent 
with this proposa1 (for reviews, see Dweck, 1996; Dweck et al., 1993; Dweck et al., 
1995a; Levy & Dweck, 1998; Levy et al., 1999). For example, entity theorists have been 
shown to assign a more important role to traits in explaining social events, relative to 
inçremental theorists. In a study by Levy and Dweck (1999), when asked to explain 
others' behaviors (e.g., "one kid would not loan his extra pencil to a classmate who 
needed one", "one kid borrowed one of his classrnate's favorite CDS and never returned 
it"), entity theonsts emphasized traits (e.g., "they are mean", "they are dishonest") more 
than did incremental theorists. In contrast, relative to entity theorists, incremental 
theorists focused more on dynamic psychological processes, including goals and 
exnotional States (e-g., '%O get attention". "they don't feel like being nice"), as well as 
situational forces (e-g., "their Wends taught them how to be bad", 'rheir parents don? 
teach them rightTT) in their attributions of social behavior (e-g., Levy & Dweck, 1999). 
Relative to incrernental theorists, entity theorists were also found to render more 
extreme inferences or predictions based on information pertaining to trait constmcts.' 
More specifically, on the basis of traits, entity theonsts make corresponding behavioral 
predictions with greater confidence. In a study by Chiu et al. (1997). when told that 
Henry is "more aggressive" than Edward on average. entity theorists more readily 
predicted that Henry would "act more aggressively" than Edward in a particular situation, 
compared to incrernental theorists. At the same tirne, entity theorists aiso make more 
extreme correspondent trait inferences based on concrete behaviors. Chiu et ai. found 
that entity theorists perceived a varïety of positive and negative behaviors (e-g., "risking 
one's life for another", "steaiing a car") as more indicative of the "goodness" and 
"badness" of the actors than did incremental theorists (see also Erdley & Dweck, 1993). 
Furthemore, entity theorists are more confident that trait-correspondent behavior will be 
consistent across different situations. Given the information that Jack was "more 
fiiendly" than Joe in a particular situation, Chiu et al. found that entity theorists predicted 
with greater confidence that Jack would also be "more fiiendly" than Joe in a different 
situation, compared to incrernental theorists (see also Erdley & Dweck, 1993). 
4 For most trait constnicts, there is likely to be a direct correspondence between the underlying trait (or 
disposition) and the kind of behaviors that one might expect fiom it (e.g., the disposition fkiendly would 
predict friendly behavior). Thus, information pertaining to trait constructs may include not only the 
underlying trait (or disposition) typically described in the form of trait adjectives (e-g., "fiiendly", "polite"), 
but also trait-relevant behaviors. 
Taken together, Dweck and colleagues' work suggests that individual differences 
in beliefs about the malleability of penonality are linked to inter-individual variations in 
the tendency to use trait constructs to understand and make inferences about the social 
world. Relative to incremental theorists, entity theorists, in viewing personality as 
consisting of fixed traits, appear to regard information about trait constnicts as more 
useful and reliable, and thereby having greater predictive value. 
Current research: hplicit  Theories and Inter-construct Inferences 
To date, in studying the link between people's implicit theones and their social 
inferences, Dweck and colleagues have focused on inferences thai lie primarily within the 
boundary of a single trait construct. We cal1 such inferences intra-construct inferences. 
Intra-construct inferences include, for exarnple, predicting the likelihood of aggressive 
behavior fiom a person lcnown to be (Le., charactenzed by the trait) aggressive, 
predicting the likelihood of friendly behavior in a particular situation on the basis of 
fnendly behavior in another situation, and infemng "goodness" or "badness" fiom the 
observation of positive and negative behaviors. 
The present research sought to extend Dweck and colleagues' work by examining 
the role of implicit theones in how people make inferences about an individual's standing 
on one trait construct, based on knowledge about the individual's standing on another 
trait construct (inter-consmict inferences). We hypothesized that the extremity of 
people's inter-constnict inferences would Vary as a h c t i o n  of two factors. The first 
factor is the strength of conceptual or semantic relatedness (i.e., sirni1arit.y versus 
oppositeness) between the trait construct on which the prediction is based (predictor 
consauct) and the trait construct about which the prediction is to be made bredicted 
construct). Based on previous findings by Koehler et al. (1996), we expected that 
perceived empirical association would be more extreme if the conceptual relatedness 
between the the predictor and predicted constructs is hi&. No evidence in the Literature 
we are aware of suggests that entity and incremental theorists would differ in their 
evaluation of conceptual relatedness between trait constructs. A second, plausible factor 
is the perceived reliability or credence of trait constructs as information upon which to 
base inferences (cf. Grifin & Tversky, 1992). Assuming that, al1 else being equal, more 
reliable information wodd be accorded greater weight in inferences, more extreme 
inferences between the predictor and predicted constructs would be expected if the 
reliability of information pertaining to trait constructs is deemed to be high rather than 
low. As explicated in the previous section, Dweck and colleagues' work suggests that 
entity theorists regard trait constmcts as more reliable bases on which to understand and 
make predictions about the social world than do incremental theorists. Thus, one might 
expect that, relative to incremental theorists, entity theonsts would make more extreme 
inter-construct inferences. 
In the present investigation, we began with an exploratory study in which we first 
assessed participants' implicit theories. Then, six to ten weeks later, we gauged their 
inter-constnict inferences using trait pairs with different levels of conceptual relatedness 
(Study 1). The progression of Our studies was in part results-dnven; in light of findings 
fkom each study, in subsequent studies we systematically varied certain aspects of the Our 
research design with the goal of pinpointing conditions that moderate the strength of the 
hypothesized relation between people's implicit theories and the extremity of their inter- 
constnict inferences. We regard this condition-seeking approach as potentially valuable 
in that it c m  increase the precision of our conclusions. and motivate refinement of the 
current theoreticai formulation (cf. Greenwald, Pratkanis. Leippe & Baumgardner. 1 986). 
In the course of the present research, we investigated two major boundary 
conditions on the relationship between implicit theories and inter-consûuct inferences. 
One such condition pertains to the degree of conceptual relatedness between the predictor 
and predicted constructs. We sought to determine whether people's implicit theories play 
a role in their inferences only when the predictor and predicted constructs are 
conceptually related (Studies 1 ,2  & 3). Another boundary condition concems the 
temporal stability of people's implicit theories. We assessed the temporal stability of 
implicit theories (Studies 3 & 4) and pursued the issue of whether people's inferences are 
strongly related only to their current implicit theories (Studies 1,2 & 3). Finally, a study 
was conducted to veri@ our assumption that people's judgments about the conceptual 





We collected data from three separate groups of participants. Participants in the 
Inventorv gr ou^ completed a personality inventory in which they rated themselves on 30 
personality trait constructs. Their ratings would provide baseiine information regarding 
the actual empirical associations of trait constructs against which the accuracy of trait 
inferences could be assessed. Participants in the Simila& Judment Grouo rated the 
semantic similarity of various pairs of trait terms used in the personality inventory. The 
semantic similarity ratings elicited from this group would serve to index the conceptual 
relatedness of al1 possible pairs of trait constmcts used in the present research. 
Participants in the Inference gr ou^ first completed the 3-item Person Theory Measure 
designed to assess their implicit theones. Six to 10 weeks later, they completed a social 
inference questionnaire in which they estimated the empirical associations among 60 
pairs of trait constructs, drawn randoml y from al1 possible pairs of trait consmcts used in 
the personaiity inventory. 
Partici~ants. Students of both genders at the University of Waterloo were 
approached by an experimenter in a student lounge and invited to participate in a short 
study for a payment of two dollars. One hundred and ninety-four students agreed to 
participate. 
Personalitv inventorv. Participants completed a personality inventory 
individually. In the inventory, they were asked to rate themselves in terms of 30 specific, 
cornrnonly-used personaiity trait constmcts (e.g., or~anized, polite, secretive, Shy). These 
trait constructs were drawn randomly from a list of 50 trait constructs used in a study by 
Koehler et al. (1996). For each of the 30 constructs, participants were asked to rate how 
well the trait construct descnbed themselves, relative to other students at the University 
of Waterloo, using a percentile score on an 1 1 -point scale niming from O to 100 in 
intervals of 10. The meaning of a percentile score was clearly explained in the 
instructions. 
Similarity Judgment Group 
Participants. Students of both genders at the University of Waterloo were 
approached by an expenmenter in a student lounge and invited to take part in a shon 
study for a payment of two dollars. One hundred and twenty students agreed to 
participate. Another 7 1 students enrolled in Introductory Psychology participated in 
exchange for either partial course credit or payrnent if they had already earned the 
maximum number of credits through participation in research. 
Linguistic similaritv iudements. The Similarity Judgment Group, as a whole, 
rated the linguistic (or semantic) similarity of al1 630 possible pairs that could be formed 
among 36 trait terms, which included the 30 specific trait terms appearing in the 
personality inventory and six additional global trait terms (i.e., extrovert, introvert, 
analytical, intuitive, decisive, and adaptive) These 630 pairs of hait ternis were 
randomly allocated across 6 questionnaire forms for participants recruited from 
Introductory Psychology. Each of these forms consisted of 105 pairs, and required about 
20 minutes to complete. The 630 pairs of trait terms were randomly allocated across 10 
questionnaire forms for participants recruited fiom the student lounge. Each of these 
shorter forms compnsed 63 pairs, and required about 10 minutes to complete. Al1 
questionnaire forms were entitled "Linguistic Similarit). Judgments". Each participant 
was instructed rate the sirnilarity in meanings of pairs of trait terms appearing in his or 
her questionnaire: 
Imagine that as part of the preparation of a thesaurus of personality trait 
The six global traits were irrelevant for the present study. They were, however, included in the linguistic 
similarity questionnaires because they were used in a m d y  not included in this thesis. 
9 
terrns, you are asked to make some judgments regarding the meaning of 
different trait terms. Sorne personality trait terms are quite similar in 
meaning (e.g., cheerful and fnendly), whereas others are quite opposite in 
meaning (e-g., friendh and hostile). Moreover, some trait terms are 
essentially unrelated in meaning (e-g., creative and cheerful). 
Below you will find pairs of personality trait terms. For each pair, please 
rate how similar they are in terms of their meaning. 
Participants indicate their similarity ratings on a 7-point scale, ranging fiom -3 (opposite 
meaning) through O (unrelated meaning) to 3 (similar meaning). 
The mean similarity rating for each of the 630 pairs of trait terms was then 
computed. In computing the mean similarity ratings, data fiom four participants recruited 
at the student lounge were discarded because their responses on many of the items were 
more than three standard deviations away fiom the means of the respective items. 
Inference gr ou^ 
Partici~ants. Eighty-one students of both genders enrolled in Introductory 
Psychology at the University of Waterloo participated in exchange for partial course 
credit. These participants were recruited on the basis of their scores on the 3-item Person 
Theory Measure (Dweck et al., 1995a). This measure was one of many other unrelated 
measures included in a prescreening questionnaire booklet distributed to al1 students 
emlled  in Introductory Psychology at the begiming of  the academic term. The Person 
Theory Measure consists of the following items: (1) T h e  kind of person someone is is 
something very basic about them and it can't be changed very much;  (2) "People can do 
things differently, but the important parts of who they are can't really be changed"; and 
(3) "Everyone is a certain kind of person and there is not much that can be done to really 
change that" (Dweck et al.. 1995a, p. 269). For each item, respondents were asked to 
indicate the extent of their agreement on a scale m i n e  fiom I to 6 (1 = stronglv - amee, 
2 = anree, 3 = slightlv agree, 4 = slidtlv disameet 5 = disagree, 6 = -. - . 
For each respondent, a person theorv score was computed by averaging his or her 
agreement with each item. A lower person theory score reflects a stronger expressed 
belief in an entity theory . Dweck and colleagues classify respondents with a person 
theory score of 3.0 or below as entity theorists, and those with a score of 4.0 or higher as 
incremental theonsts. Using these cutoff scores, Dweck and colleagues have typically 
found that about 85% of respondents tend to be evenly distributed between the two 
theorist groups, and the remaining 15% or so are unclassified (Chiu et al., 1997; Dweck 
et al., 1995a; Levy et al., 1998). Following the criteria used by these researchers, only 
respondents with a person theory score of 3.0 or below (entity theonsts) and those with a 
score of 4.0 or above (incremental theorists) were recruited for the inference group of the 
present study . 
In validation studies conducted by Dweck and colleagues, the Person Theory 
Measure showed high intemal consistency, with Cronbach's alphas ranging fiom .90 to 
-96 (Cronbach's alpha was .86 in the present sîudy). The test-retest reliability of the 
measure was reported to be .82 over a 2-week interval. [n terms of the discriminant 
validity of the measure, these researchers reported that scores on the Person Theory 
Measw are independent of respondents' age and sex. Person theory scores also do not 
correlate with standard measures of self-presentational concems, cognitive abilities, self- 
esteem, optimism about human nature, ideologicai rïgidity or political stance (see Chiu et 
al., 1997; Dweck et al., 1995a: Levy et dl 1998 for further details about the 
psychometric properties of the Person Theory Measure). 
Social inference questionnaire. Any time fiom 6 to 10 weeks afier students 
enrolled in Introductory Psychology completed the Person Theory Measure, participants 
were recruited to take part in an experimental session in which they completed a social 
inference questionnaire. Each experimental session included between one and IO 
participants. In the social inference questionnaire, participants were asked to judge the 
empincal association of 60 pairs of trait constructs. These construct pairs were randomly 
selected from al1 435 possible pairs that could be forrned among the 30 specific trait 
constructs appearing in the personaiity inventory. For each construct pair, participants 
were presented with the information that, based on self-ratings, one character (Person A) 
is higher than another person (Person B) in terms of their relative standing on a 
designated trait constnict. With such information, participants were asked to estimate the 
probability that the same relative standing holds for another trait constnict. Here is a 
sample question: 
Person A is more SYMPATHETIC than Person B. 
What is the probability that Person A is also more GENTLE than Penon B? 
Participants were asked to indicate their judgrnent on a 2 1 -point probability scale running 
fiom 0% to 100% in intervals of 5% for each item. They were provided with detailed 
instructions of how to use the scale, as follows: 
If you think the information that Person A is higher than Person B on the 
first trait (e.g., SYMPATHETIC) does not provide any useful information 
regarding their relative standing on the second trait (e.g., GENTLE), you 
wouid circle 50%. By giving a judgrnent of 50%. you are saying that 
Person A and Person B have an equal chance of being higher on the second 
trait even though Person A is higher on the first trait. 
If you think that Person A will also be higher than Person B on the second 
trait, circle a value above 50%. In the extreme case where you are 
completely certain that Person A is higher than Person B on the second 
trait, circle 100%. 
In contrast, if you think that Person A will be lower than Person B on the 
second trait, circle a value below 50%. In the extreme case where you are 
completely certain that Person A is lower than Person B on the second trait, 
circle 0%. 
This question format followed that used by Kunda and Nis bett ( 1 986), where participants 
were asked to estimate the probability that two pairs of observations would have the same 
rank ordering. An advantage of this question format is that participants' percentage 
estimates can be mathematically converted into correlation coefficients. For example, an 
estimate of 50% can be converted to a correlation coefficient of O, an estimate of t00% 
can be converted to a correlation coefficient of 1, and an estimate of 0% can be converted 
into a correlation coefficient of -1. Using this question format, people have been s h o w  
to be capable of providing probability estimates that yielded accurate estimates of actual 
correlations (Kunda & Nis bett, 1 986). In the present stud y, such conversion would 
permit cornparisons between participants' percentage estimates and the actual 
correlations of trait constmcts, as obtained using the self-ratings fiom the Inventory 
Group. 
Results 
Probability Judgments in the Social Inference Ouestionnaire 
To examine how the Inference Group participants' probability judgments in the 
social inference questionnaire varied as a fûnction of their implicit theories and the 
semantic similarity of the conshuct pairs, their probability judgrnents were subjected to a 
criterion-scaled, hierarchical regression analysis" ' with variables listed in Table 1.1 as 
predictors.8 Data from two participants fiom the Inference Group were discarded 
because they failed to complete a fairly large number of items. Also discarded were data 
fiom one participant whose responses on many inference items were more than three 
standard deviations fiom the means of the respective items, leaving a total of 78 
Merence Group participants in the analysis. As noted earlier, the semantic similarity of 
the construct pairs was indexed by the mean similarity ratings fiom Sirnilarity Judgment 
Group. Results are presented in Table 1.1. 
--__-O_ Insert Table 1.1 about here------- 
6 Throughout the current investigation, we chose to ueat "implicit theory" as a continuous variable to hlly 
capture the magnitude of participants' irnplicit beliefs in Our main statistical analyses. Treating "implicit 
theory" as a two-level categorical variable, as Dweck and colleagues have done in their research, generally 
yielded similar results. With "implicit theory" as a continuous variable, a regression approach was used. 
As similarity was a within-subject variable in the present design, criterion-scaling was required to represent 
subject-related variables. An introduction to criterion-scaled regressions can be found in Pedhazur (1 982, 
chap. 14). 
' This analysis involved a series of regressions whereby each predictor variable in Table 1 was 
cumulatively entered in the order listed. In the first regression, the first predictor variable was entered. In 
the second regression, both the first and the second predictor variables were entered. In the third 
regression, the first, second and third predictors were entered, and so on. 
8 Al1 subject-related variables were criterion-scaled variables sew ing as error terms. 
9 The sum of squares associated with each predictor variable was obtained by subtracting the regression 
sum of squares at the step where it was entered by the regression sum of squares obtained at the preceding 
step. Using a similar logic, the degrees of fieedom associated with each predictor variable was obtained. 
As usual, the mean squares of the predictor variables were computed by dividing the relevant surn of 
squares by their associated degrees of fkedom, and the F ratios by dividing the relevant mean squares by 
their associated mean square errors. 
Figure 1.1 helps to clarie the pattern of results. In this figure, the horizontal axis 
represents the mean similarity ratings of constnicts pairs obtained fiom the Similarity 
Judgment Group; the vertical axis represents the mean probability judgments for the 
consmct pairs obtained fiom the Inventory Group. The rneans of entity and incremental 
theonsts' probability judgments for construct pairs of different levels of similarity are 
displayed in this figure- Also displayed are the simple regression lines predicting the 
mean probability judgments fiom the mean similarity ratings of the construct pairs, with 
separate lines for entity and incremental theonsts. 
------- Insert Figure 1.1 about here------ 
As indicated in Table 1.1, the criterion-scaled regression yielded a significant 
main effect of similarity. Inspection of Figure 1.1 shows that, regardless of implicit 
theory, the more similar (Le., positively semantically related) the construct pair, the 
higher was the judged probability that the relative standing of Person A and Person B on 
one member of the constmct pair would also hold for the other member of the pair. The 
more opposite (Le., negatively semanticaily related) the construct pair, the lower was the 
judged probability that Person A and Penon B's relative standing on one member of the 
construct pair will hold for the other rnember. 
The main effect of similarity was qualified by a significant Theory X Similarity 
interaction. As illustrated in Figure 1.1, the two theonst groups differed in their 
judgments of empirical association of construct pairs as the pairs became increasingly 
10 
similar, or increasingly opposite, but not when they were unrelated. Relative to 
10 Due to the complicated nature of the present study, results are described here in terms of entity versus 
incremental theorist distinction to sirnplie presentation, even though "implicit theory" was tteated as a 
continuous variable in the criterion-scaled regression. 
incremental theorists. entity theorists perceived that it was slightly more probable that a 
person having a relativeiy hi& standing on a trait construct would also have a relatively 
high standing on another trait constmct if the two constructs had reasonably similar 
meanings. At the same time, compared to incremental theorists, entity theorists 
perceived that it was slightiy less probable that a person who had a relatively high 
standing on a trait construct would also have a relatively high standing on another trait 
constmct if the two constructs had reasonably o ~ ~ o s i t e  m anings. It should be noted that 
this Theory X Similarity interaction was a very weak one. As clearly shown by a 
cornparison of the slopes of the regression lines for the two groups of theorists in Figure 
1.1, implicit theories appeared to exert only a very rnodest influence on the relationship 
between construct similarity and extremity of trait inferences. 
Com~arinn Estimated and Actual Correlations among Trait Constructs 
Recall that participants in the Inventory Group provided self-ratings on each of 
the specific trait constructs used in the social inference questionnaire. Actual correlations 
for al1 the construct pairs used in the social uiference questionnaire could be computed 
using these self-ratings. To compare Inference Group participants' estimates of the 
empirical associations among the construct pairs with the actual correlations from the 
Inventory Group, their probability judgments were mathematically converted into 
correlation coefficients (cf. Kunda & Nisbett, 1986). For each construct pair, we 
computed the mean of these coefficients for both entity and incremental theorists. In 
Figure 1.2, the mean of entity and incremental theorists' estimates for each constmct pair, 
expressed in terms of mean correlation coefficients, were plotted dong with the actual 
correlations for each construct pairs against the mean similarity ratings provided by the 
Similarity Judgment Group. Note that the vertical axis now represents correlation 
coeffkients. 
--O--O- Insert Figure 1.2 about here------ 
Inspection of Figure 1.2 shows that both entity and incremental theorists were 
generally accurate in predicting the direction of empiricai associations for the constmct 
pairs. That is, for the most part, participants predicted positive empirical associations for 
construct pairs that were in fact positively correlated, and predicted negative empirical 
associations for construct pairs that were in fact negatively correlated. Note, howek-er. 
that the predictions fiom the Inference Group tended to be far too extreme. On average. 
the predictions vastly overestimated the extent to which actual correlations among 
construct pairs increased with postive semantic relatedness (i.e., similarity) and decreased 
with negative semantic relatedness (Le., dissimilarity). Cornpared to the sizeable 
deviations of both entity and incremental theonsts' perceived associations fiom the actual 
associations, the theory effect we found for conceptually related pairs appears particularly 
srnall . 
Discussion 
Consistent with the findings by Koehler et al. (1996), Inference Group 
participants' estimates of empirical association between trait constructs were based, to a 
large extent, on the conceptual relatedness of the constructs. The more similar or the 
more opposite in meaning the construct pairs, the stronger was the perceived ernpirical 
association. In their heavy reliance on conceptual relatedness as a basis for judgment, 
participants tended to predict a degree of empincal association between trait constructs 
far greater than the actual correlations. 
Participants' implicit theories. as measured any time from 6 to 10 weeks prior to 
their inferences, were related to the extremity of their inter-constnict inferences only 
when the constructs involved were conceptually related. For sirnilar or opposite 
constmct pairs, entity theorists rendered more extreme inferences than did incremental 
theorists; for unrelated construct pairs, entity and incremental theorists' inferences 
generdly did not differ. Although the observed relationship between participants' 
implicit theories and the extremity of their uiferences was in the direction we expected 
for the conceptually related construct pairs. the magnitude of this relationship was very 
weak in Study 1. In the next two studies, we attempted to identi@ the conditions under 
which a stronger relationship might be observed between people's implicit theories and 
their inter-construct inferences. 
Study 2 
In Study 1, the 60 consmict pairs used in the social inference questionnaire were 
randomly selected fiom al1 435 possible pain among 30 specific constructs appearing in 
the personality inventory. A natural consequence of this random selection method was 
that the rnajority of the construct pairs were essentially unrelated in meaning. Only a few 
pairs were moderately related, and even fewer were strongly related, as rated by the 
Similarity Judgment Group. With so few strongly related constructs, the social inference 
questionnaire in Study 1 may not have offered an ideal test of conditions under which an 
implicit theory effect might emerge, as it was only under conditions of high conceptual 
relatedness that we found some hint of such an effect. In Study 2, we attempted to more 
clearly demonstrate the role of implicit theones in people's inter-constnict inferences by 
including more construct pairs with a high degree of conceptual relatedness in the social 
inference task. 
A secondary purpose of Study 2 was to explore how people's inter-constnict 
inferences might be affected by how the trait constructs were depicted. Trait constructs 
can be referred to simply by trait adjectives (which we ofien simply cal1 "traits"), such as 
"fiiendly" and "aggressive", which are typically interpreted as reflecting dispositions or 
some underlying qualities. Altematively, trait constructs could also be depicted in terms 
of their correspondent behaviors, such as "fkiendly behavior" and "aggressive acts". In 
Study 2, we made a fine distinction between underlying traits and trait-relevant behavior 
(cf. Chiu et al., 1997). With this distinction, we incorporate several possible variants into 
the inter-constnict inference task: (a) using information about a certain kind of behavior 
to predict a trait (Le., behavior-to-trait inference), (b) using information about a trait to 
predict a certain behavior (Le., trait-to-behavior inference), (c) using information about a 
certain behavior to predict another kind of behavior (Le., behavior-to-behavior inference), 
and (d) using information about a trait to predict another trait (Le., trait-to-trait inference). 
Participants in Study 1 essentially made only trait-to-trait inferences. In the present 
study, participants were asked to make al1 four types of inferences. 
Method 
Overview 
Participants' implicit theories were first assessed using the 3-item Person Theory 
Measure. Two to 10 weeks later, they completed a social inference questionnaire in 
which they made behavior-to-trait, trait-to-behavior. behavior-to-behavior, and trait-to- 
trait inferences involving sirnilar, unrelated and opposite pais  of trait constructs. 
Participants 
Two hundred and eight students of both genders enrolled in Introductory 
Psychology at the University of Waterloo participated in exchange for partial course 
credit. Participants were recruited on the basis of their responses on the 3-item Person 
Theory Measure. This measure was one of many other unrelated rneasures included in a 
prescreening booklet distributed to al1 students enrolled in Introductory Psychology at the 
beginning of a term. Only respondents with a person theory score of 3.0 or below (entity 
theorists) and those with a score of 4.0 or above (incremental theorists) were recruited for 
the present study. The Cronbach's alpha for the Person Theory Measure was -94 in the 
present study. 
Social Inference Ouestionnaire 
Any time fiom 2 to IO weeks after students enrolled in Introductory Psychology 
completed the Person Theory Measure, participants were recruited to take part in an 
experimental session in which they completed a social inference questionnaire. Each 
experimental session included between one and 10 participants. In the social inference 
questionnaire, participants were presented with the information that one character (Person 
A) is higher than another (Person B) with regard to their standing on a designated trait 
construct. Based on this information, participants were asked to estimate the probability 
that the same relative standing holds for another trait constmct. The predictor and 
predicted constructs were M e r  specified as either underlying traits or as trait-relevant 
behavior (see Table 1.2). 
------Insert Table 1.2 about here------- 
The questionnaire was divided into four major sections. Each section dealt with 
one of the following types of inference: (a) behavior-to-trait inference, in which 
participants made predictions about a certain trait, based on information about a certain 
class of behavior; (b) trait-to-behavior inference, in which they made predictions about a 
certain class of behavior, based on information about a certain trait; (c) behavior-to- 
behavior inference, in which they made predictions about a certain kind of behavior. 
based on information about another kind of behavior; and (d) trait-to-trait inference, in 
which they made predictions about a certain trait, based on information about another 
trait. The order in which the sections including these four inference types appeared in the 
questionnaire was counterbalanced in a Latin square design. Thus, there were four 
versions of the questionnaire, each with a different order of inference types. 
In each section of the questionnaire, there were 60 inference items, with an equal 
nurnber (20) involving similar, unrelated and opposite construct pairs (see Table 1.2). 
The same 60 construct pairs were used in each of the four inference types, yielding 240 
items in each version of the social inference questionnaire. The 60 construct pairs were 
drawn from the list of al1 possible pairs (i.e., 435 pairs) among the 30 specific constructs 
used in the personality inventory in Study 1. Recall that mean similarity ratings for each 
possible construct pair were obtained in Study 1, where the Similarity Group participants 
rated the similarity of construct pairs on a 7-point scale, ranging fiom -3 (opposite 
meaning) through O (unrelated meaning) to 3 (similar rneaning). To maximize the 
differences in the mean similarity ratings among the similar, unrelated, and opposite 
constnict pairs in the present study, one might simply use the 20 pairs with the most 
positive similarity ratings, the 20 pairs with similarity ratings closest to 0, and the 20 
pairs with the most negative similarity ratings. Howeve- we found that this approach of 
maximizing similarity difference would result in a high level of redundancy in the 
selected constructs (i-e., the tendency for some constructs to show up in many more pairs 
than others). In general, there was a tradeoff between the goals of maximizing similarity 
differences and minimizing constnict redundancy. In selecting the similar, unrelated and 
opposite sets of constnict pairs, we identified a combination of constnict pairs that 
maintained a fairly large similarity difference between sets while preventing the 
redundancy from becoming too extreme. For the set of constmct pairs thus selected. the 
mean similarity ratings for the similar, unrelated and opposite sets were 2.03,0, and - 
1.18 respectively. Within each selected constmct pair, one member was randomIy 
assigned as the predictor constnict, and the other member as the predicted construct. The 
same 60 pairs of constnicts were used for al1 four inference types, and appeared in the 
sarne random order within each of the four sections of the questionnaire. 
Table 1.2 shows the exact wordings of severai example items for each inference 
type. As in Study 1, participants were asked to indicate their predictions on a 2 1 -point 
probability scale, running from 0% to 100% in intervals of 5%. They were given detailed 
instructions on how to use the probability scale comparable to those provided in Study 1. 
The social inference questionnaire took about an hour to complete. 
Results 
To examine how the probability judgments varied as a function of irnpiicit theory. 
construct similarity, and inference type, we averaged each participants' judgments within 
the 20 similar, 20 unrelated, and 20 opposite items for each inference section. With three 
similarity levels and four inference types, there were 12 such composite judgment scores 
for each participant. These judgrnent scores served as the dependent variable in a 
critenon-scaled hierarchical regression analysis. with variables listed in Table 1.3 as 
predictors. ' ' 
------- Insert Table 1 -3 about here------- 
As shown in Table 1.3, the anaiysis yielded sipificant main effects of inference 
type and similarity, which were qualified by two statistically reliable two-way 
interactions. Of foremost relevance to this s ~ d y  was the significant Similarity X Theory 
interaction. To clarify the nature of this interaction, we performed three simple 
regressions, one for each similarity level. In each of these simple regressions, 
participants' average composite judgment scores over the four inference type conditions 
were regressed on their implicit theory scores. 
Figure 1.3 displays graphically the slopes of these simple regressions. In general, 
participants' theory scores did not CO-vary with the extremity of their probability 
judgments for unrelated constructs. For related constructs, however, there was a trend 
such that lower theory scores, reflecting stronger expressed belief in an entity theory, 
were associated with slightly more extreme inter-construct inferences. Specifically, the 
more strongly participants believed in an entity theory, the more probable they thought 
that a person having a relatively high standing on a specific constmct would also have a 
higher standing on another specific constmct if the two constructs were similar in 
meaning. At the same time, a stronger endorsement of an entity theory was also 
I I  In this analysis, "similarity" was treated as a categorical variable with three levels (similar, unrelated and 
opposite) instead of as a continuous variable, as in Study 1. The reason was that, in the present study, the 
way we selected constmct pairs for the similar, unreiated and opposite conditions ensured that there would 
be Iittle variance in similafity ratings within each of the three similarity conditions. Treating "sirnilarify" as 
a continuous variable would not increase the precision of the analysis to any discemable extent, but would 
increase the complexity of the analysis considerably. 
associated with lower perceived likelihood that an individual with a relatively hi& 
standing on a specific constnict would also have a higher standing on another construct 
when the two constmcts were opposite in meaning In short, consistent with Study 1. the 
Similarity X Theory interaction effect indicated that people's implicit theories appeared 
to play a role in their predictions regarding empincal association between semantically 
related constructs, but not unrelated ones. As can be seen in Figure 1.3, this interaction 
effect was quite modest in magnitude. 
------ Insert Figure 1 -3 about here------- 
In addition to the Similarity X Theory interaction effect, the analysis also revealed 
a significant Inference X Similarity interaction. Generally, regardless of participants' 
theory scores, inference type affected their judgments for similar consmict pairs but did 
not have a clear eflect for unrelated and opposite pairs'2. For similar pairs, participants 
exhibited greater codidence when basing their uiferences on trait information (M = 76.7 1 
for trait-to-behavior inferences; M = 77.02 for trait-to-trait inferences) than when basing 
their predictions upon behavioral information (M = 74.36 for behavior-to-trait inferences; 
M = 73.16 for behavior-to-behavior inferences). -
Discussion 
The fhdings of the present study were highly similar to those obtained in Study 1. 
Participants' implicit theories, as assessed any time fiom 2 to 10 weeks prior to their 
inferences, were predictive of their inter-constmct inferences only when the constructs 
involved were conceptually related. While a strong expressed belief in an entity theory 
" This statement was made through inspection of means, and was not made on the basis of more fine- 
grained statistical analyses. Given that the sample size of the present study was very large @ = 208) and 
that both "inference type" and "similarity" were within-subject factors, follow-up tests to the Inference X 
Similarity interaction were highly sensitive; almost any such test yielded statistically significant results. 
was associated with more extreme inferences involving similar or opposite pairs, such 
belief did not bear any relationship with inferences involving unrelated pairs. Even 
though the direction of relation between participants' implicit theories and the extremity 
of their inter-constnict inferences was consistent with our expectation, it was a very weak 
relationship, despite our effort to more clearly demonstrate an effect of implicit theory by 
using more strongly related construct pairs in the present study. The small effect of 
implicit theory across the first two studies perplexed us, given that Dweck and 
colleagues' work strongly suggests that trait constructs are regarded by entity theorists, 
relative to incremental theorists, as more reliable bases for social understanding and 
predictions. In the next study, we continued with our attempt to identifi critical 
procedural variations that would strengthen the relationship between people's implicit 
theories and inter-constntct inferences. 
Results of the present study showed that the extremity of people's inter-construct 
inferences can be affected by whether the trait constmcts involved are described solely in 
terms of trait adjectives (trait information), or depicted through trait-relevant behavior 
(behaviotal information). Participants were found to make more extreme inferences 
involving similar constructs when such inferences were based on trait information than 
when they were based on behavioral information. To the extent that people are 
dispositionists who regard traits as underlying causes and behaviors as consequences (cf- 
L. Ross & Nisbett, 199 1 ), the present finding meshes well with Tversky and Kahnemanw s 
(1982) view that inferences fiom causes to consequences would be made with a greater 
degree of certainty than inferences in the reverse direction. The observation that trait-to- 
behavior inferences involving similar constructs were made with greater confidence than 
were behavior-to-trait inferences involving the same constructs is particularly consistent 
with their view. 
Study 3 
Only a very weak theory effect was observed for participants' inferences 
involving related constructs in Studies 1 and 2. We suspected that one possible 
explanation for the weak theory efEect concems the timing of the assessment of implicit 
theories. Recall that participants in these two studies completed the 3-item Person 
Theory Measure several weeks prior to the inter-constmct inference task (6 to 10 weeks 
in Study 1,2 to 10 weeks in Study 2). Such an assessment was conducted on the 
assumption that implicit theones as measured by the Person Theory Measure are 
temporally stable. Careful examination of the available data pertaining to the stability of 
the Person Theory Measure, however, suggests that this assumption may not be entirely 
justified. In validation studies conducted by Dweck and colleagues, the test-retest 
reliability of the 3-item Person Theory Measure was reported to be -82 over a two-week 
interval; the corresponding figure for the 8-item Person Theory Measure (to be descnbed 
in greater detail in Study 4) was reported to be .82 over a one-week interval and .7 1 over 
a four-week interval (Dweck et al., 1995a; Levy et al., 1 998). Data on longer-tenn 
stability of the Person Theory Measure are lacking. In fact, some researchers (e-g., 
Schunk, 1995; Sorrentino, 1995) have questioned but not tested whether people's implicit 
theories remain stable over a relatively long period of tirne. 
The predictive utility of people's implicit theories depends upon the temporal 
stability of such theories. If an individual's implicit theory changes over time, then his or 
her theory at one point in time might not be very indicative of his or her social inferences 
at another point in time. Dweck and colleagues typically obtained both measures of 
implicit person theories and related inferences within a single experimental session (e-g., 
Chiu et al.' 1997; Erdley & Dweck, 1993; Gervey? Chiu, Hong & Dweck. 1999; Heyman 
& Dweck, 1998; Levy & Dweck, 1999; Levy et al., 1998), with some exceptions 
involving a one- or two-week gap between the measurement of implicit theones and 
related inferences (e-g., Hong, Chu, Dweck & Sacks, 1997). Frorn these studies alone, 
the relatively long-term predictive utility of implicit theories cannot be ascertained. 
In Study 3, to address the possibility of temporal fluctuations in people's implicit 
theories, we assessed participants' theories on two occasions. First, their theones were 
assessed any time fiom 2 to I O  weeks before they made inter-construct inferences (Time- 
l), using the 3-item Person Theory Measure, as in the previous studies. On the day they 
made ùiferences (Time-2)' their theories were re-assessed using the 3-item Person Theory 
Measure. 
Another possible explanation for the weak effect of theory in Studies 1 and 2 was 
that the 3-item Person Theory Measure used in these studies may have been far too 
general. It might not adequately capture participants' beliefs about the malleability of the 
specific constructs appearing in the inter-constnict inference task. TO ensure that beliefs 
regarding al1 specific constructs involved in the inference task were fully covered in our 
theory assessment, we developed an additional, 30-item theory measure that specifically 
assessed people's beliefs about each of the constructs appearing in the inference task. In 
Study 3, this 30-item measure was included as part of the Time-2 assessment of 
participants' implicit theories, dong with the 3-item Person Theory Measure. 
Yet another possible account for the weak effect of theory in the first two studies 
pertained to the fact that each participant was exposed to inference items uivolving 
similar, unrelated and opposite construct pairs. Since semantic similarity of construct 
pairs has a very strong effect on people's inter-construct inferences (Koehler et al.. 1996), 
participants' attention rnight be drawn so heavily to this influentid variable that other 
potential considerations, such as the malleability of trait consmicts. are overlooked. We 
conjectured that if each participant was to make inter-constnict inferences involving only 
one of the three similarity categories (similar, unrelated or opposite), the relative salience 
of similarity in inter-construct uiferences would be reduced, thus allowing for leeway for 
implicit theones to play a larger role in the inferences. Consequently, in our attempt to 
create favorable conditions for the emergence of a larger theory effect, participants in 
Study 3 were presented with inference items involving either only semantically similar or 




Participants' implicit theories were initially assessed by the 3-item Person Theory 
Measure. Two to 10 weeks later, they made behavior-to-trait, trait-to-behavior, behavior- 
to-behavior, and trait-to-trait inferences involving either similar or unrelated pairs of 
constructs. Their implicit theories were also re-assessed by the 3-item Person Theory 
Measure, as well as by a 30-item measure that addressed their beliefs about the specific 
constructs involved in the inter-construct inference task. 
Participants 
Two hundred and four students of both genders enrolled in Introductory 
Psychology at the University of Waterloo participated for partial course credit. As in 
Studies 1 and 2, participants were recruited on the ba i s  of their responses on the 3-item 
Person Theory Measure. This measure was one of many other unrelated measures 
included in a prescreening booklet distributed to d l  students enrolled in Introductory 
Psychology at the beginning of the term. Only respondents with a person theory score of 
3.0 or below (entity theonsts) and those with a score of 4.0 or above (incremental 
theonsts) would be recruited to participate in the present study. 
Procedure and Measures 
Social inference questionnaire. Any time fiom 2 to 10 weeks after students 
enrolled in Introductory Psychology had completed the Person Theory Measure, 
participants were recruited to take part in an experimental session on social judgrnents. 
Each expenmental session included between one and 10 participants. To start with, each 
participant was asked to complete a social inference questionnaire. The questionnaire 
was identicd to that used in Study 2, with the exception that, on each version of the 
questionnaire, the inference items involved either only similar construct pairs (similar 
condition) or only unrelated constmct pairs (unrelated condition]. For both similar and 
unrelated conditions, the same 20 construct pairs were for each of the four types of 
inference (behavior-to-trait, trait-to-behavior, behavior-to-behavior, and trait-to-trait 
inferences), yielding 80 items in each version of the social inference questionnaire. This 
questionnaire took about 30 minutes to complete. 
Measures of im~licit  theories. Participants were then asked to complete two 
measures of implicit theories. The first was the 3-item Person Theory Measure, which 
was exactly the sarne measure that they had completed two to 10 weeks earlier. The 
second was a 30-item measure that specifically assessed participants' implicit theories 
regarding each of the 30 constructs appearing in the social inference questionnaire. The 
wording of the items in this measure followed one of the items in the Person Theory 
Measure (Le., "The kind of person sorneone is, is something basic about them, and it 
can't be changed very much"). Each item specifically addressed their beliefs regarding 
the malleability of one trait constmct. For example, the item for the constmct organized 
was "How organized a person is, is something fixed, and cannot changed very much''. 
As in the Person Theory Measure, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which 
they agreed with each of the 30 items on a 6-point scale (1 = s t rone l~  a-, 2 = agree, 3 
= slightly agree, 4 = slightly disamee, 5 = disamee, 6 = stronely disaeree). Lower values 
on this scale reflect a stronger expressed belief that a certain trait construct is fixed rather 
than malleable. 
For the ease of presentation, we will call the 3-item Person Theory Measure 
administered at the beginning of the term the time-1 eeneral theorv measure. As for the 
scales adrninistered during the experimental session, we will call the 3-item Person 
Theory Measure the time-2 eeneral theory measure, and the 30-item measure the time-2 
omnibus theory measure. 
Res~onses to Measwes of Implicit Theories 
Participants' responses to al1 three measures of implicit theories showed high 
interna1 consistency (Cronbach's a = -94 for time-1 general theory mesure,  .91 for time- 
2 general theory measure, -94 for time-2 omnibus theory mesure). Each participant's 
responses to al1 items within each measure were averaged to give a theory score. Hence. 
there were three theory scores for each participant, narnely, a time-1 general theory score. 
a time-2 general theory score, and a time-2 omnibus theory score, with lower scores 
indicating stronger expressed belief in an entity theory. 
The two- to IO-week test-retest reliability of the general theory measure, as 
indexed by the Pearson product-moment correlation between the -1  and Ume-2 general 
theory score, was .46. This figure suggests that although people scoring higher on the 
measure at tkne 1 also tended to score higher at time 2. there is a considerable degree of 
instability in people's theones over a two- to IO-week interval. 
There was a reasonably strong relationship between scores on the general and 
omnibus theory measures, with a Pearson correlation coefficient of -57 between the 
general and omnibus scores obtained at time-2. 
Probability Judments in the Social Inference Ouestionnaire 
For both similar and unrelated conditions, we averaged each participant's 
probability judgments over al1 20 items within each of the four types of inferences, 
yielding 4 composite judgrnent scores for each participant. These composite judgment 
scores were submitted to criterion-scaled, hierarchical regression analyses, with variables 
listed in Table 1.4 as predictors'3. We used the time-l general theory scores, the time-2 
general theory scores and the time-2 omnibus theory scores in turn to index implicit 
theories in the analyses. Results are summarized in Table 1.4. 
_-----_ Insert Table 1.4 about here------- 
l3 Following Study 3. "similarity" was treated as a categorical variable in the analyses. 
3 1 
In general, participants' implicit theories were reliabl y related to their composite 
judgment scores only when measurement of their theories was obtained in the same 
session in which they made social inferences. As shown in Table 1.4, neither the main 
effect of theory nor the Theory X Similarity interaction was statistically significant when 
the time-1 measure was taken as an index of implicit theories. By contrast, when either 
of the time-2 theory measures was used as an index of implicit theones, there was a 
significant main effect of theory, qualified by a significant Theory X Similarity 
interaction. 
To elucidate the nature of a Theory X Similarity interaction, one can perfonn a 
simple regression at each level of sirnilarity. In these simple regressions, participants' 
average composite judgment scores over the four inference conditions were regressed on 
theory scores. We performed such analyses using each of the three rneasurernents of 
implicit theones in turn. The slopes of these simple regressions are graphically depicted 
in Figure 1.4. Generally, the time-1 general theory scores did not CO-vary with 
participants' judgrnents to any meaningful degree in either the similar or the unrelated 
condition. In contrast, the time-2 general theory scores were used, lower theory scores 
were clearly associated with higher or more extreme probability judgments in the similar 
condition, but no such association was observed in the unrelated condition. Note that 
both time-1 and time-2 general theory scores were obtained from the same 3-item Person 
Theory Measure. When the time-2 omnibus theory scores were used to index 
participants' implicit theories, the panem of association between theory scores and 
probability judgments was similar to that when the time-2 general theory scores were 
used. In short, the significant Theory X Similarity interactions obtained using the time-2 
general and omnibus measures indicated that the more strongly participants endorsed an 
entity theory at a aarticular moment, the more probable they thought that one's relative 
standing on a certain constmct is predictive of one's relative standing on other 
semantically similar, but not unrelated, constructs at that'moment. 
------- Insert Figure 1.4 about here------ 
Theory-related effects aside, as in Study 2, we found main effects of similarity 
and inference type. These two main effects were qualified by a significant Merence X 
Similarity interaction (see Table 1.4). To clarie the nature of the interaction, we 
conducted a separate one-way analysis for each similarity condition. For the similar 
condition. a significant effect of inference type emerged, F (3,294) = 17.70, p < .O0 1, 
MSE = 24.71. Participants exhibited greater confidence when basing their inferences 
involving similar constnicts on trait information (M = 69.23 for trait-to-behavior 
inferences; M = 68.29 for trait-to-trait inferences) than when basing such inferences on 
behavioral information (M = 65.4 1 for behavior-to-trait inferences; M = 64.95 for 
behavior-to-behavior inferences). By contrat, for the unrelated condition, the effect of 
inference type was not significant, F (3 ,3  12) = .79, MSE = 20.08. Participants' 
judgments across the four inference types in the unrelated condition were virtually 
identical. The pattern of this Inference X Sirnilarity interaction was similar to that found 
in Study 2. 
Finally, a significant Inference X Theory X Sirnilarity effect emerged when time- 
1 general theory measure was used as an index for implicit theories (see Table 1.4). 
Considering that we did not expect such an effect on theoretical grounds and that the 
corresponding three-way interaction was not statistically significant in other two 
regression models involving time-2 theory measures in the present study, nor in the 
regression analysis in Study 2, this apparently incidental result will not be considered 
M e r .  
Discussion 
Results of the present study pinpoint a critical procedurai factor necessary for the 
emergence of a clear theory effect in people's inter-construct inferences. Participants' 
implicit theones exhibited a certain degree of temporal instability across the two- to 10- 
week interval between the two assessments of their theories. Accordingly, in the present 
study, a systematic relationship between implicit theones and social inferences was found 
only when the implicit theory mesure and the social inferences were obtained within the 
same experimental session, and not when they were obtained weeks apart. This 
observation is consonant with the findings in Studies 1 and 2 that participants' theones as 
measured weeks prior to their inferences tended to bear only a weak relationship with the 
extrernity of their inferences. Taken together, results across Studies 1 ,2  and 3 reveal a 
major boundary condition on the relation between people's implicit theories and the 
extremity of their social inferences: implicit theories fluctuate across time, and the 
extrernity of social inferences is related strongly only to current theories. 
Participants' current (or time-2) theories were clearly related to their inferences 
involving similar, but not unrelated, constructs. For similar constnicts, current belief in 
an entity theory was associated with more extreme or confident inter-constnict 
inferences. Recall that a theory effect comparable in direction though much smaller in 
magnitude was observed for related, but not unrelated, constmcts in Studies 1 and 2, 
where participants' theories were measured weeks pnor to the inference task. Based on 
Dweck and colleagues' work, we have suggested in the introduction that people holding 
an entity theory could be expected to make more extreme inter-constmct inferences 
because an entity theory engenders the perception that trait constmcts are reliable bases 
for social understanding and prediction. In light of the findings from the first three 
studies, a qualification of our suggestion is in order. It appears that the perceived 
reliability of trait constructs, as determined at least in part by people's beliefs about the 
malleability of personality, is considered relevant or applicable in inter-construct 
inferences only when the constnicts involved are conceptually related. This observation 
d e s  out the possibility that subscribing to an entity theory is associated with generally 
greater confidence or generaily more extreme judgments (e-g., a greater tendency to use 
response scale endpoints). Holding an entity theory is associated with more extreme 
inferences only when beliefs regarding the malleability of personality are deemed to be 
relevant or applicable to the inference task at hand. 
To summarize, fmdings thus far suggest that a clear association between 
endorsement of an entity theory and relatively more extreme inter-construct inferences 
can be expected only under certain conditions: People's implicit theones will predict 
their inter-construct inferences well only when their theories are measured at the time the 
inferences are made and only so long as such inferences involve conceptually related 
constnicts. 
Study 4 
in Study 3, participants' implicit theories were assessed on two occasions, with an 
intervening penod of any time between two to 10 weeks. Such repeated assessments 
permit us to estimate the temporal stability of their theories over a two- to 1 O-week 
interval.'"n Study 4, we sought to increase the precision of the test-retest reliability 
estimate by focusing on the stability of people's theories over an eight-week interval and 
using a larger sample of participants. In the present study, participants' implicit theories 
were assessed by the recently developed 8-item Person Theory Measure (Levy et al., 
1998), instead of the original 3-item measure, allowing us to evaluate the possibility that 
the $-item measure would exhibit greater temporal stability. Given that the 3-item 
measure is a proper subset of the 8-item measure (see Method section), test-retest 
reliability estimates of both measures c m  be obtained simultaneously fiom repeated 
administration of the 8-item measure. 
Method 
Participants 
The sample consisted of 269 students enrolled in Introductory Psychology at the 
University of Waterloo. At the beginning of the term (time-1), most students enrolled in 
the course completed a lengthy prescreening booklet in which the 8-item Person Theory 
Measure was included along with many other unrelated measures. About eight weeks 
after students returned the questionnaire booklets (the-2), a second questionnaire 
booklet was distributed. In this second booklet, the 8-item Person Theory Measure was 
again included along with other unrelated measures. Students received partial course 
credit for completing these booklets. The sample of the present study is composed of 
students who completed the &item Person Theory Measure in both booklets and allowed . 
their responses in the second booklet be linked to those in the first booklet. 
14 One might in fact examine the test-retest reliability of the measure on a week-by-week bais  within the 
two- to IO-week interval. A major concem of using this approach in Study 3 was that the sample sizes for 
some of the weeks would be too small to yield reliable estimates of temporal stability. 
Person Theorv Measure 
Whereas the original 3-item Person Theory Measure only comprises items 
endorsing an entity theory, the 8-item Person Theory Measure consists of an equal 
number of items endorsing each theory. The 8-item measure includes the three entity 
items fiom the original measure, one new entity item, and four new incremental items. 
The new entity item is: "As much as 1 hate to admit it, you can't teach an old dog new 
tricks. People can't really change their deepest attributes". The incremental items are as 
follows: "Everyone, no matter who they - can significantly change their basic 
characteristics"; "People can substantially change the kind of person they are"; "No 
matter what kind of a person someone is, they can always change very much"; "People 
can change even their most basic qualities" (Levy et al., 1 998, p. 143 1 ). 
As in the original 3-item measure, for each item in the 8-item Person Theory 
Measure, participants were asked to indicate the extent of their agreement on a scale 
running from 1 to 6 (1= stronelv aeree, 2 = aeree, 3 = slightl~ amee3 4 = slightly 
disagree, 5 = disaaee, 6 = stronnlv disameel. For each respondent, an 8-item person 
theory score was computed by averaging his or her responses to the entire scale, with the 
incremental-items reverse scored. A 3-item person theory score was also computed by 
averaging his or her responses to the subset of entity items comprising the original 3-item 
measure. A lower &item or 3-item person theory score reflects a stronger expressed 
belief in an entity theory. 
Results 
The 8-item Person Theory Measure showed high intemal consistency (Cronbach's 
a = .9 1 at time-1 , .93 at time-2), as did the 3-item subset which comprises the original 3- 
item Person Theory Measure (Cronbach's a = -86 at time-1' .88 at lime-2) 15. The test- 
retest reliability of the 8-item measure, as indexed by the Pearson product-moment 
correlation between time-1 and time-2 8-item person theory scores, was -57 over the 
eight-week interval. For the 3-item subset' the eight-week test-retest reliability was -43. 
Table 1.5 illustrates the extent of changes in participants' status as entity or incrementai 
theonsts over the eight-week interval. In general, regardless of whether the entire 8-item 
measure or just the 3-item subset was used as a basis of classification, about 60% 
participants classified as either entity or incremental theorists at time- 1 received the same 
classification at time-2, while the remaining 40Y0 received a different classification. 
.--- Insert Table 1.5 about here------ 
Discussion 
The present study yielded new data regarding the temporal stability of people's 
implicit theories as measured by the Person Theory Measure. M i l e  Dweck and 
colleagues reported that the test-retest reliability of the Person Theory Measure is fairly 
high over a relatively short interval (.82 over a two week interval for the 3-item measure, 
-82 over a one-week interval and -7 1 over a four-week interval for the 8-item measure), 
findings of the present study suggest that its test-retest reliability drops considerably over 
a longer time span (.43 and .57 over an eight-week interval for the 3-item and 8-item 
measure respectively). This level of temporal stability is arguably lower than what one 
would expect for a stable personality disposition. An analysis of temporal stability of 
eight frequently used self-report personality inventories (Schuerger, Zarrella & Hotz, 
1s The average inter-item correlation for the 8-item Person Theory Measure was .57 at time- 1 and -62 at 
time-2. The corresponding figure for the 3-item subset was .67 at time-1 and -7 1 at time-2. 
1989). including the Myers-Brïggs Type Indicator, the Califomia Psychological 
Inventory (CPI), the Minnesota Multiphasic Penondity Inventory (MMPI), the Sixteen 
Personality Factor Questionnaire (1 6 PF), indicated that the average test-retest reliability 
for al1 the scales tapping personality traits was about .73 over a two-month period. The 
test-retest reliability was .80 for extraversion scales alone and -70 for anxiety scales 
alone. By cornparison, then, people's implicit theories appear less stable than many other 
individual differences variables measured by self-report. 
Study 5 
In Study 3, we found that endorsement of an entity theory at the time of 
inferences was associated with more confident or extreme inter-constmct inferences for 
conceptually related constructs. To account for this finding, we have argued that the 
perceived stability or malleability of trait constmcts is a relevant consideration in 
inferences involving semantically related personality constructs. As Dweck and 
col1eaguesy work indicates that an entity theory fosters the view of trait constmcts as 
more reliable bases for social perception than does an incremental theory, more confident 
inferences could be expected fiom people holding an entity theory at the time of 
judgrnent. In our view, the relatively more extreme inferences rendered by participants 
holding an entity theory at the time of judgment was not due to the fact that they 
perceived stronger semantic associations between traits than those holding an incremental 
theory, but rather that they made more extreme judgments given a particular level of 
semantic association between the constructs in question. Study 5 was designed to rule 




Participants rated the semantic relatedness of either the 20 pairs of similar or 
unreiated traits that were used in Study 3. Afterwards, participants also completed the 8- 
item Person Theory Measure. 
Participants 
Participants were 1 O3 students of both genders enrolled in Innoductory 
Psychology at the University of Waterloo. A booklet that consisted of a number of short 
questionnaires fiom different researchers, including two questionnaires for the present 
study, were distributed to students enrolled in the course. Students were given partial 
course credit for returning the questionnaire booklet. 
Procedures and Measures 
Linguistic Similaritv Judgments. Participants completed a questiomaire entitled 
"Linguistic Similarity Judgments". They were instructed to imagine that as part of the 
preparation of a thesaurus of personality trait terms, they were asked to rate the similarity 
of meaning of 20 pairs of trait ternis. In the sirnilar condition, participants were 
presented with 20 pairs of similar traits used in Study 3. In the unrelated condition, they 
were presented with 20 pairs of unrelated traits used in Study 3. In both conditions, they 
were asked to indicate their similarity ratings on a 7-point scale, ranging fiom -3 
(opposite meaning) through O (unrelated meaning) to 3 (similar meaning). 
Person Theow Measure. The "Linguistic Similarity Judgrnents" Questionnaire 
was followed by the 8-item Person Theory Measure, content and scoring of which was 
identical to that described in Study 4. 
Results and Discussion 
Data fiom one participant whose responses on many the similarity judgrnent items 
were more than three standard deviations from the corresponding means were discarded? 
leaving a total of 102 participants. For both similar and unrelated conditions, we 
averaged each participant's linguistic similarity judgments for al1 20 items, thus yielding 
a composite similarity judgment score for each participant. Participants' composite 
similarity judgment scores were subrnitted to hierarchical regression analyses, with 
variables listed in Table 1.6 as predi~tors. '~ Their 8-item person theory scores and 3-item 
person theory scores (computed fiom the subset of items constituting the original 3-item 
measure) were used in tum to index their implicit theories. Results of the analyses are 
presented in Table 1.6. 
------- Insert Table 1.6 about here------ 
Oniy a significant main effect of similarity was found. This effect indicated that 
participants generally rated the trait pairs in the similar condition as more similar than 
those pairs in the unrelated condition (see Figure 1.5). This observation is not surprising, 
given that the assignrnent of trait pairs in the similar and unrelated conditions in both the 
present study and Study 3 was based on the Linguistic similarity judgments obtained fiom 
the Sirnilarity Judgment Croup in Study 1. Regardless of whether the 8-item person 
theory score or the 3-item person theory score was used to index participants' implicit 
theories, neither the theory main effect nor the Theory X Similarity reached statistical 
significance, indicating that participants' current implicit theones were not related to their 
linguistic similarity judgments. Based on these results, one can conclude that more 
16 Following Studies 2 and 3, the predictor "similarity" was treated as a categorical variable in the analyses. 
41 
extreme inferences involving related constructs observed from participants endorsing an 
entity theory rather than an incremental theory at the time of inference in Study 3 was not 
due to the possibility that these participants perceived closer semantic associations among 
trait constructs. 
------- Insert Figure 1 -5 about here------- 
General Discussion 
The current research examined how individual differences in beliefs regarding the 
malleability of personality are linked to inter-individual variations in the extremity of 
inter-construct inferences. Based on previous research by Dweck and colleagues, which 
suggested that entity theorists more strongly regard trait constnicts as reliable bases for 
social predictions than do incremental theorists, we hypothesized that entity theorists 
would make more extreme inter-construct inferences than would incrernental theorists. In 
a senes of studies, this hypothesis was clearly borne out only under circumscnbed 
conditions. The goal of the current investigation becarne one of identifjhg conditions 
that affect the strength of ~ h e  hypothesized reiation between implicit theories and inter- 
construct inferences. 
One boundary condition concerns the conceptual or semantic relatedness between 
the predictor and predicted constructs. Participants' implicit theones were related, to 
various degrees, to their inter-construct inferences as hypothesized only when the 
predictor and predicted constructs were conceptually related (Studies 1,Z & 3). This 
observation suggests that the issue of fixedness versus malleability of personality is 
considered relevant and hence applied only in inferences involving conceptually related, 
and not unrelated, constructs. Among other things, this result indicates that it is indeed 
the implicit personality theory held by entity or incremental theorists, rather than some 
other individual difference variable distinguishing the two groups (e-g., general sense of 
confidence, or tendency to use response scale endpoints), that contributes to observed 
differences in their social inferences. 
Another boundary condition stems fiom the temporal instability of people's 
implicit theones (Studies 3 & 4). A systematic relationship between implicit theories and 
social inferences was clearly observed only when participants' implicit theories were 
measured at the time the inferences were made (Study 3). The extremity of participants' 
inferences was only weakly related to their implicit theories as measured weeks before 
the inference task (Study 1 ,2  & 3). In short, the extremity of people's inter-construct 
inferences appears to be related strongly only to their current theories. 
Identification of these boundary conditions in the current investigation is 
important in two ways. First, demonstrating that people's social inferences are strongly 
related to their implicit theories only as measured at the time of inference, and only where 
such theories are perceived to be relevant, provides a more fme-grained understanding of 
the relationship between individual differences in implicit theories and inter-individuai 
variations in social inferences. Second, a deeper contribution is that the present results 
motivate refinements to the current theoretical perspective. Our initial research used 
Dweck and colleagues' individual-differences perspective to investigate the link between 
implicit theories and social inferences. From this perspective, in which individuais are 
classified as entity or incremental theorists, how the entity and incremental theorists 
differ in their social inferences is the question of interest (Dweck et al., 1995a). The 
observation that people's implicit theories exhibit temporal instability and that people's 
inferences are related strongly only to their curent theories highlights the limitations of 
the individual-differences perspective. A strict individual-differences approach cannot 
explain and predict variations in the states of knowledge and confidence in inferences for 
a given individual. To accommodate such intra-individuai variability? a broader 
theoretical formulation is required. We reasoned that a knowledge-activation framework 
(Higgins, 1996) has the potential to capture intra-individual variations in knowledge 
states. In Part II, how this alternative h e w o r k  can be used to understand the link 
between people's knowledge regarding the malleability of personality and their social 
inferences was delineated and empiricaily evaluated. 
PART II 
LAY PERSONALITY KNOWLEDGE AND CONFIDENCE IN SOC~AL INFERENCES: 
A KNOWLEDGE-AGI-IVATION PERSPECTIVE 
When trying to understand or make predictions about themselves or others, people 
may draw upon their lay personality knowledge. Broadly defined, lay personality 
knowledge refers to a set of cornmonsense assumptions about the nature of the self and 
other people. The idea that such knowledge plays a role in people's social understanding 
is not new (e.g., Kelly, 1955)' and has recently gained increasing recognition among 
social-cognitive psychologists (Wegener & Petty, 1998). Many kinds of lay knowledge 
have been found to have implications for social thinking; for example, knowledge about 
the nature of persona1 attributes (e.g., Dwecket al., 199Sa; M. Ross, 1989), causes of 
behavior (e-g., Trope & Gaunt, 2000; Ybarra & Stephan, 1999), relations among 
personality traits (e.g., Anderson, 199Sa; Schneider, 1973), stereotypes (e.g., Devine, 
1989; Kunda & Sinclair, 1999), attachent styles (e-g., Baldwin, Keelan. Fehr, EMS & 
Koh-Rageragjoo, 1996), as well as culturally conferred conceptions of persons (e.g., 
Menon, Morris, Chiu & Hong, 1999). In our research program, we focus on how 
people's lay conceptions about the malleability of personality relate to the confidence 
with which they make inferences based on person information (see also Part 1, this 
thesis). 
Individuai-differences Perspective 
The present research is largely built upon Dweck and colleagues' seminal 
contributions. They proposed an individual-differences mode1 to conceptualize the 
relationship between people's lay beliefs about the malleability of personality and their 
associated patterns of social judgments and reactions (Dweck & Leggett. 1988: Dweck et 
ai., 1995a; Dweck et al., 1993). Dweck and her colleagues have identified two lay beliefs 
(or implicit theones) that people may hold about personality: (1) entitv theorv, the belief 
that personality is fixed, and (2) incremental theorv, the belief that personality is 
malleable. People who subscribe to an entity theory are referred to as entitv theorists, 
whereas those who subscribe to an incremental theory are referred to as incremental 
theorists. 
Assessment of Implicit Theories 
Dweck and colleagues developed a Person Theory Measure to assess people's 
implicit theories of personality.'* 2.3 The original measure comprises three items: (1) "The 
kind of person someone is, is something basic about hem, and it can't be changed very 
' The focus of our research program has been on people's lay knowledge about the malleability of 
personality. It is worth noting that, according to Dweck and colleagues, individuals need not possess one 
sweeping belief that cuts across al1 domains. Individuals may hold different lay beliefs in such domains as 
intelligence and morality (Dweck et al., 1995a). For example, some individuals may believe chat 
personality is malleable but intelligence is f ~ e d ,  and vice versa. Indeed, these researchers have developed 
domain-specific measures that assess people's beliefs about the mal!eability of intelligence and moral 
character. 
' In this thesis, the term implicit theory refers specifically to people's beIiefs about the malleability of 
personality, as defined by Dweck and colleagues (Dweck et al., 1995a), although this tenn has also been 
used by other researchers to refer to other cornmonsense notions about persona1 attributes. For instance, 
this term has been used to refer to people's conceptions of relations arnong personality traits (e.g., 
Anderson, 1995a; Schneider, 1973), and to people's beliefs about the stability of personal attributes over 
time (M. Ross, 1989). 
The implicit theorist depicted by Dweck and colleagues (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Dweck et al., 1995a) 
bears some resemblance with chat described by M. Ross (1989), given the similarity of the idea of 
"fixedness versus malleability" of persona1 attributes central to the former and the idea of "stability versus 
change" fiindamental to the latter. There are, however, some conceptuat differences between the two 
theoretical formulations. Fitst, whereas a persona1 attribute that changes over time is essentially 
"malleable", an attribute that is stable over time is not necessarily "fixed". M. Ross' implicit theorist 
possesses an understanding of conditions that facilitate change, even in attributes deemed to be rather 
stable. Second, while Dweck and colleagues emphasize individual differences in implicit theories (see 
fiirther discussion in text), M. Ross concentrates on the shared aspects of theories. In Dweck and 
colleagues' analysis, Person A may believe that a given attribute is fixed and Person B may believe that it 
is malleable. In contrast, in M. Ross' formulation, people in general may believe that Attribute X is more 
stabIe than Attribute Y (M. Ross, 1989). 
much"; (2) "People can do things differently, but the important parts of who they are 
can't really be changed very much"; (3) "Everyone is a certain kind of person and there is 
not much that c m  be done to really change that" (Dweck, et al., 1995a, p. 269). 
Respondents are asked to indicate their extent of agreement with each item on a scale 
running fiom 1 to 6 (1 = stronel~ aeree, 2 = aeree. 3 = sliehtlv aDee, 4 = sliehtlv 
disagree, 5 = disagree, 6 = stronslv disapree). An individual's agreement with each item 
is averaged to compute a person theory score. A lower theory score reflects a stronger 
expressed belief in an entity theory. Respondents with a score of 3 .O or below are 
classified as entity theotists and those with a score of 4.0 or above as incremental 
theorists. More recently, Dweck and colleagues also developed an eight-item Person 
Theory Measure. Whereas the original measure only includes items endorsing an entity 
theory, this new measure includes an equai number of items endoning each theory (the 
three entity items fiom the original measure, one new entity item, and four new 
incremental items). The new entity item is: "As much as 1 hate to admit it, you can't - 
teach an old dog new tricks. People can't really change their deepest attributes". The 
incremental items are as follows: "Everyone, no matter who they are, can significantly 
change their basic characteristics"; "People can substantially change the kind of person 
they are"; "No matter what kind of a person someone is, they can always change very 
much"; "People can change even their rnost basic qualities" (Levy et ai., 1 998, p. 1 43 1 ). 
Dweck and colleagues reported that scores on the Person Theory Measure are 
independent of respondents' age and sex. Scores on the Person Theory Measure also do 
not correlate with standard measures of self-presentation concems, cognitive abilities, 
self-esteem, optimism about human nature, ideological rigidity or political stance (see 
Chiu et al., 1997; Dweck et al., 1995a; Levy et al., 1998 for detailed discussion of the 
psychometric properties of the Person Theory Measure). 
Im~licit Theories and Social Inferences 
Dweck and colleagues proposed that people's implicit theones have wide-ranging 
consequences for how they understand and react to person information (for reviews, see 
Dweck, 1996; Dweck et al, 1995a; Dweck et al., 1993; Levy & Dweck, 1998; Levy et al., 
1999). Indeed, these researchers presented an extensive body of evidence that, when 
faced with incoming person information, entity and incremental theorists differ how they 
attend to, encode, and organize such information in memory (e.g., Hong et al.. 1997). 
Furthermore, entity and incremental theonsts also differ in their social inferences about 
individuals (e-g., Chiu et ai., 1997) and groups (Levy & Dweck, 1999; Levy et al., 1998), 
as well as in their social decision-making (Gervey et al., 1999). 
In the realm of social inferences, more specifically, Dweck and colleagues 
showed that entity theorists make more confident inferences about themselves and others 
based on incoming person information than do incremental theorists. Relative to 
incremental theorists, entity theonsts more strongly believe in a close correspondence 
between traits and behaviors. Entity theorists more readily infer traits on the bais  of 
one's behavior in a particular situation (Chiu et al., 1997; Heyman & Dweck, 1998), and 
predict with greater certainty one's behavior in a particular situation based on one's traits 
(Chiu et al., 1997). Furthermore, entity theorists more strongly believe that one's 
behaviors exhibit cross-situational consistency (Chiu et al., 1997) and temporal stability 
(Erdley & Dweck, 1993) than do incremental theorists. 
Evaluatine the Individual-differences Perspective 
The emphasis of Dweck and colleagues' work has been on individual differences 
in implicit theories. One person may subscnbe to an entity theory and another an 
incremental theory. How the entity and incremental theonsts differ in their judgments 
and reactions has been the main focus of investigations. 
The predictive utility of an individual-differences perspective depends on the 
temporal stability of people's implicit theories. To the extent that their theories are 
stable, uemendous parsirnony is offered by the possibility that diverse patterns of social 
inferences and reactions, as demonstrated by Dweck and colleagues, can be traced to the 
entity versus incremental theorist distinction. The usefùlness of this individual- 
differences approach, however, will be undermined if people's theories are temporally or 
situationaily unstable. In that case, an individual's status as an entity or incremental 
theorist at a certain point of t h e  might not be very indicative of his or her patterns of 
judgments and reactions at another point in tirne. 
Recent studies in our laboratory, together with validation studies conducted by 
Dweck and colleagues, have yielded some data pertaining to the temporal stability of 
implicit theones. Dweck and colleagues (Dweck et al., 1995a; Levy et al., 1998) 
reported that the test-retest reliability of the Person Theory Measure is fairly high over a 
relatively short interval (32 over a two-week interval for the three-item measure, -82 over 
a one-week interval and .71 over a four-week intemai for the eight-item measure). 
Several studies in our laboratory, however, indicate that its stability drops over a longer 
time span (see Part 1, this thesis). For example, in a large-scale validation study, we 
found that the eight-week test-retest reliability of the Person Theory Measure was -43 for 
the three-item measure and -57 for the eight-item measure. 
The temporal stability of people's irnplicit theories is arguably lower than what 
one would expect for a stable personality attribute. An analysis of test-retest reliabilities 
of eight frequently used self-report personality inventories (Schuerger, Zarrella, & Hotz, 
1989), including the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, the Califomia Psychological 
Inventory (CPI), the Minnesota Muitiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), the Sixteen 
Personality Factor Questionnaire (16 PF) revealed that the average stability for al1 the 
scales tapping personality traits was about .73 over a two-month period. The 
corresponding figure was .80 for extraversion scales alone, and .70 for anxiety scales 
alone. By cornparison, then, people's implicit theories appear to be less stable than many 
other individual difference variables measured by self-report, even though available 
reliability data also indicate a certain degree of stability in such theones. 
As noted, the temporal instability of people's implicit theories might weaken its 
predictive utility. In studies conducted by Dweck and colleagues, both measures of 
implicit theories and reiated inferences were typically obtained within the same 
experimental session (e-g., Chiu et al., 1997; Erdley & Dweck, 1993; Gervey et al., 1999; 
Heyman & Dweck, 1998; Levy & Dweck, 1999; Levy et al., 1998), with some exceptions 
involving a one- or two-week gap between the measurement of implicit theones and 
related inferences (e.g., Hong et ai., 1997). The predictive utility of implicit theories over 
a longer time fiame cannot be ascertained fiom these studies alone. A series of studies 
we conducted, however, revealed that temporal fluctuations in people's implicit theories 
constitute a major boundary condition on the relation between their theories and 
confidence in social inferences. Specifically. we found that the confidence of 
participants' personality inferences was clearly related to their theories as measured at the 
tirne of judgment, but not much so to their theories as measured a month or two before 
they made the inferences (see Part 1, this thesis). 
Taken together, there is evidence that people's implicit theories exhibit some 
temporal instability, and that people's confidence in their social inferences is related to 
their current theones. Such intra-individual variability limits the usefdness of an 
individual-differences approach in adequately describing the relation between people's 
lay personality knowiedge and their sociai inferences. 
Knowledge-activation Perspective 
Given the apparent limitations of the individual-differences perspective, in this 
part of our research program, we use a knowledge-activation perspective to elucidate the 
link between people's lay personality knowledge and their social inferences. This 
knowledge-activation perspective incorporates insights from social cognition theorists 
regarding the activation of knowledge structures (e-g., Higgins, 1996; Kruglanski, 1990). 
As will be clear in the following analysis, a distinctive virtue of this perspective is that it 
has the capacity to capture variations in the state of knowledge within an individual, 
which are not amendable to an explanation fiom a strict individual-differences 
standpoint. 
Entitv Knowledge and Incremental Knowledge 
We proceed nom the assumption that most people possess some knowledge 
consistent with the notion that personality is fixed, and also possess some knowledge 
consistent with the notion that personality is malleable, even though they may only 
explicitly endorse one of the two contradictory notions (or neither) at a particular 
moment. Such knowledge may include general abstractions about the determinants of 
personality and memones of specific people or instances accumulated through persona1 
expenence, everyday social encounters, or fiom the media. We refer to the packet of 
knowledge consistent with the notion that personality is fixed as entity knowledge, and 
the packet consistent with the notion that personality is malleable as incrementai 
knowledge. These packets of lay personality knowledge can be viewed as knowledge 
structures. 
At this point, it might be useful to cl&@ a subtle distinction between 
personalitv beliefs and lav personality knowledee in our conceptualization. Lay 
personality beliefs are viewed as general notions about personality that are endorsed or 
accepted as tme. The existence (or availability) of both entity and incremental 
knowledge in one's memory does not necessarily entai1 endorsement of the general 
notion that personality is fixed, or the notion that personality is malleable. In this sense, 
lay personality beliefs are on1 y are subset of lay personality knowledge. In fact, a similar 
distinction between belief and knowledge has been made by some stereotype researchers 
(e.g., Devine, 1989), who argue that knowledge of a stereotype does not necessarily 
imply endorsement of the stereotype. indeed, under certain conditions, it has been found 
that knowledge of a stereotype has an impact on social perception even for people who 
do not endorse the stereotype (see, e.g., Devine, 1 989). From our perspective, Dwec k 
and colleagues' mode1 pertains to lay personality beliefs about the malleability of 
personality, in that individuals are classified as entity or incremental theorists based on 
whether they endorse the general notion that personality is fixed or the notion that 
personality is malleable. People's lay personality knowledge about the malleability of 
personality is more inclusive, as it encompasses not only their general beliefs, but also 
any other pieces of knowledge associated with the notions of fixedness and malleability 
of personality. 
It should be noted that Dweck and colleagues, dong with a few other researchers 
(e-g.? Anderson, 199%; Kniglanski, 1995), have similarly suggested that people may 
hold both entity and incremental theories, and that these theories c m  be viewed as 
knowledge constmcts (Dweck, Chiu & Hong, 1995b; Levy et al., 1999). However, as 
mentioned earlier, Dweck and colleagues have chosen to focus primarily on the 
implications of individual differences in implicit theones in their research, and have not 
pursued the issue of how implicit theories might vary within an individual using a 
knowledge-activation h e w o r k .  The value of using a knowledge-activation fhmework 
to understand how people's lay knowledge about the malleability of personality 
influences their social thinking remains to be empirically evaluated, and is the main focus 
of this thesis. 
Accessibility of  la^ wrsonality knowledge and social inferences 
Insights about the activation of knowledge structures amassed in social cognition 
research can be applied to address how people's entity and incremental knowledge might 
become operative in particula. social iderence tasks. A key prernise of such research is 
that possessing a certain knowledge structure does not entai1 continuously relying on it in 
one's judgments and behaviors. Attempts have been made to identifi factors affecting 
the activation of knowledge structures (see, e.g., Higgins, 1989; Higgins, 1 996; Higgins 
& Brendl, 1995; Kniglanski, 1990). The concept of accessibili~ has received the most 
attention. Generally, accessibility refers to the readiness with pieces of knowledge come 
to the fore of the individual's mind. Different lines of research investigating the role of 
lay knowledge in social-information processing have converged to the general conclusion 
that the more accessible an existing knowledge structure is. the more likely it is to guide 
social interpretation. For example, Baldwin et al. (1996) showed that most people 
possess knowledge about different at tachent  styles; how they evaluate information 
about persona1 relationships at a particular moment is influenced by the relational pattern 
most accessible at the time. In a similar vein, Hong, MorrÏs, Chiu and Benet-Martinez 
(2000) reported evidence that, for people who have intemalized two cultures, their 
interpretations of social behavior are affected by the set of culturally-conferred social 
knowiedge that is accessible at the time of judgment. 
People's lay knowledge about the malleability of personality rnay guide their 
social inferences in an analogous manner. The relative accessibility of entity versus 
incremental knowledge is likely to be an important determinant as to which set of 
knowledge is used at a particular moment. Where applicable, the relatively more 
accessible set of lay knowledge would be expected to have a greater impact on the 
individual's social inferences than the less accessible set. Al1 else being equai, 
individuals might differ in the relative readiness with which their entity or incremental 
knowledge cornes to mind (Le., chronic accessibilitv). Situational or contextual factors, 
however, are likely to operate in addition to any influence of chronic accessibility and 
momentarily affect the relative ease and speed with which the two sets of knowledge 
come to the fore of an individual's mind (Le., temDorarv accessibility) (cf. Levy et al., 
1999). In essence, the present conceptualization has the capacity to accommodate inter- 
individual differences in the relative accessibility of entity versus incremental knowledge, 
as well as intra-individual variations of such accessibility found over time and across 
situations. 
Current Research 
In the current research, we used a knowledge-activation framework to investigate 
the relation between people's lay conceptions about the malleability of personality and 
their confidence in social inferences. We sought to evaluate the causal influence of 
participants'lay knowledge on their social inferences by experimentally manipulating the 
relative accessibility of pre-existing entity versus incremental knowledge through 
situational cues (i.e., temporary accessibility) before asking them for their ùiferences. 
We expected that, where applicable, the same general principle-that greater confidence 
in social inferences is associated with the view of personality as fixed than with the view 
of personality as malleable-would apply regardless of whether such views are made 
temporarily accessible through situational cues (or pnmed), or nahually endorsed by 
different individuals. In other words, we hypothesized that participants would exhibit 
greater confidence in their social inferences when their entity knowledge is primed than 
when their incremental knowledge is primed. 
Evaluation of this hypothesis requires social inference tasks where people's 
knowledge about the malleability of personality is applicable. To this end, the present 
research focused on the kinds of social inferences that bear well-understood links with 
people's current implicit theones: (1) infemng penonality traits fiom relevant behaviors, 
(2) predicting behaviors from relevant personality traits, (3) predicting the cross- 
situational consistency of behaviors, and (4) predicting the temporal stability of 
personality traits (Chiu et al., 1997; Erdley & Dweck. 1993; see also Part 1, this thesis). 
Before testing our hypothesis, Study 1 was conducted to ascertain that the confidence 
with which peopIe make these inferences-in the fonn to be presented to participants in 
subsequent priming studies (Studies 2 & 3+is associated with their current impticit 
theories. Findings of Study i will also allow us to assess whether our priming 
manipulations in Studies 2 and 3 can exert efiects on social inferences comparable to 




Ninety-seven undergraduates of both genders enrolled in Introductory Psychology 
at the University of Waterloo participated in exchange for course credit. Each 
experimental session included between one and I O participants. 
Procedures and Mesures 
Social inference questionnaire. Participants first completed a four-part socia 
inference questionnaire. In each part, they made one of the following types of inferences: 
(1) infemng traits on the b s i s  of relevant behavion (Le., behavior-to-trait inferences), 
(2) predicting behavior fiom relevant traits (i.e., trait-to-behavior inferences), (3) 
predicting the consistency of behaviors across situations (i.e., behavior-to-behavior 
inferences), and (4) predicting the stability of traits over time (i.e., trait-to-trait 
inferences). The order in which ihese four types of inferences appeared in the 
questionnaire was counterbalanced in a Latin square design. Hence, there were four 
versions of the questionnaire, each with a different sequence of inference types. 
We employed a questionnaire format used by Kunda and Nisben (1986) involving 
judgrnents of the probability that Person A's standing on a designated personality 
amibute exceeds that of Person B given their relative standing on some other amibute. 
Table 2.1 shows the exact wordings of an example item for each inference type. In each 
item, participants were asked to make social uiference regarding a single personality 
amibute. For example, they were asked to predict "fnendly behavior" on the bais  of the 
trait "fiiendly" in a trait-to-behavior inference item. They were asked to indicate their 
judgment on a 2 1 -point probability scale ninning fiom 0% to 100% in intends of 5% for 
each item. 
-___ Insert Table 2.1 about here------- 
Participants were instructed in detail how to use the probability scale. The 
instruction for the part on trait-to-behavior inference, for example, read as follows: 
If you think that the relative standing of Person A and Person B on a certain 
trait (e-g., the t& friendly) does not provide any useful information about their 
relative standing on a certain kind of behavior (e-g., behaved in a friendly way) 
in a particuiar situation, you would circle 50%. By giving a judgment of 5O%, 
you are saying that Person A and Person B have an equal chance of exhibiting a 
certain kind of behavior even though Person A is higher on the trait. 
If you think that Person A will exhibit more of the kind of behavior than Person 
B, circle a value above 50%. In the extreme case where you are completely 
certain that Person A will exhibit more of the kind of behavior than Person B, 
circle 100%. 
In contrast, if you think Person A will exhibit less of the kind of behavior than 
Person B, circle a vaiue below 50%. In the extreme case where you are 
completely certain that Person A will exhibit & of the kind of behavior. circIe 
0%. 
For each inference type, participants xere asked to rnake inferences regarding 30 
commonly-used personality attributes, such as warm, polite, optimistic, and assertive. 
The sarne 30 attributes were used for al1 four inference types, yielding 120 inference 
items in each version of social inference questionnaire. The questionnaire took about 30 
to 40 minutes to complete. 
Measures of implicit theones. Upon completion of the social inference 
questionnaire, participants' implicit theones were assessed. They were asked to complete 
the 3-item Person Theory Measure developed by Dweck and colleagues. Moreover, they 
also completed a 30-item theory measure that we developed. This 30-item measure was 
designed to assess participants' implicit beliefs about each of the personality attributes 
used in the social inference task. In this measure, the wording of the items generally 
followed one of the items in the Person Theory Measure (i.e., "The kind of person 
sorneone is, is something basic about them, and it can't be changed very much"). Each 
item specifically addressed their beliefs regarding the malleabiiity of one personality 
attribute. As an example, the item for the attribute assertive was "How assertive a person 
is, is something fixed and cannot be changed very much". Similar to Dweck and 
colleagues' measure, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed 
with each of the 30 items on a 6-point scale (1 = stronglv agree; 2 = aaee; 3 = slightly 
aqree; 4 = slightlv disamee; 5 = disamee; 6 = stronnlv disagree). Lower values on this 
scale reflect a stronger expressed belief that a certain personality attribute is fixed. 
For the ease of  presentation, we will call the M e m  Person Theory Measure 
developed by Dweck and colleagues the general theorv measure, as it is a domain-general 
measure regarding personality as a whole. We will call the 30-item measure we devised 
the omnibus theorv measure, as it covers a broad range of individual personality 
attri butes. 
To some extent, the present study is a replication of Dweck and colleagues' work 
(Chiu et ai., 1997; Studies 1 & 2). Within the sarne expenmental session, they assessed 
participants' implicit theones using the general theory measure and their confidence in 
making either trait-to-behavior or behavior-to-behavior inferences using the Kunda and 
Nisbett (1986) questionnaire format. They found that entity theonsts were more 
confident than were incremental theorists when making both types of inferences. This 
finding, however, was based on a relatively small number of personal attnbutes (1 0 in the 
behavior-to-trait inference task and 4 in the behavior-to-behavior inference task). The 
present study thus supplements their work with a much broader selection of personality 
attributes. Furthemore, as the present study used the same 30 personality attributes for 
four types of social inferences, it allows us to directly compare participants' confidence 
in these four types of inferences and to determine whether or not the role of implicit 
theories differs across different inference types. 
Resul ts 
Responses to Measures of Implicit Theories 
Both measures of implicit theories demonstrated high intemal consistency 
(Cronbach's a = .87 for the general theory measure and -93 for omnibus theory 
rnea~ure).~   or each participant, we computed a general theory score and an omnibus 
theory score by averaging his or her responses to al1 items on each scale. Participants' 
general theory scores and the omnibus theory scores were moderately related Cr = -45, p < 
.O 1). 
Probabilitv Judgments in the Social Inference Questionnaire 
For each participant, we computed four composite judgment scores by averaging 
his or her probability judgments of al1 30 items within each of the four inference types in 
the social inference questionnaire. These composite judgrnent scores served as the 
dependent variable in criterion-scaled, hierarchical regression analyses5. 6 ,  with variables 
listed in Table 2.2 as predictoa.7* * We used participants' general theory scores and 
omnibus theory scores in turn to index their implicit theories in these analyses, the results 
of which are presented in Table 2.2. 
-----_- Insert Table 2.2 about here------- 
The mean inter-item correlation for the general theory measure (-69) was higher than the corresponding 
figure for the omnibus theory measure (.3 1). However, since the omnibus theory consists of a larger 
number of items than the general theory measures, the interna1 reliabilities of the two measures are 
comparable. 
We chose to treat "implicit theory" as a continuous variable instead of as a categorical variable so that the 
magnitude of participants' implicit beliefs could be hl ly  captured in our statistical analyses. With "implicit 
theory" as a continuous variable, a regression approach was used in lieu of a typical mixed ANOVA. As 
inference type was a within-subject variable in the present design. criterion-scaling was required to 
represent subject-related variables. An introduction to criterion-scaled regressions can be found in 
Pedhazur (1982, chap. 14). Treating "implicit theory" as a two-level categorical variable, as Dweck and 
colleagues have done in their research, and using a mixed ANOVA as an analytical technique yielded 
results similar to those obtained by Our regression analyses. 
6 This technique involved a series of regressions whereby each predictor variable in Table 2 was 
cumulatively entered in the order listed. In the first regression in the series, the first predictor variable was 
entered. In the second regression, both the first and the second predictor variables were entered. In the 
third regression, the first, second and third predictors were entered, and so on. 
7 Al1 subject-related variables were criterion-scaled variables serving as error terms. 
8 The surn of squares associated with each predictor variable was obtained by subtracting the regression 
sum of squares at the step where in was entered by the regression sum of squares obtained at the preceding 
step. Using a similar logic, the degree of fieedom associated with each predictor variable was obtained. As 
usual, the mean squares of the predictor variables were then computed by dividing the relevant sum of 
squares by their associated degrees of fieedom, and the F ratios by dividing the reIevant mean squares by 
their associated mean square errors. 
The analyses yielded a significant main effect of theory only when the omnibus 
theory scores were used to index participants' implicit theories. When the general theory 
scores were used, the theory main effect was not significant (see Table 2.2). Using each 
of the two measurements of implicit theones in turn, we performed simple regressions to 
clanfi the nature of the relationship between participants' implicit theones and their 
probability judgments. In these simple regressions, participants' average composite 
judgment scores over the four types of inferences were regressed on their theory scores. 
Figure 2.1 depicts the slopes of these simple regressions. When the general theory scores 
were used, lower theory scores appeared to be very weakly associated with more 
confident judgments. When the omnibus theory scores were used, the association 
between the theory scores and probability judgments became more apparent. Lower 
omnibus theory scores, reflecting a stronger belief in the fixedness of the personality 
attributes, were clearly associated with more confident judgments. In short, the 
confiidence with which participants made social inferences was specifically related to 
their beliefs about the malleability of the personality attributes used in the social 
inference questionnaire, and much less so to their beliefs regarding the malleability of 
personality in general. 
-----O- Insert Figure 2.1 about here----- 
We also found a significant main effect of inference type (see Table 2.2). In 
general, participants were more confident when basing their predictions on trait 
information (M = 74.34 for trait-to-behavior inferences; M = 68.94 for trait-to-trait 
inferences) than when basing their predictions on behavioral information (M = 66.04 for 
behavior-to-trait inferences; M = 63.73 for behavior-to-behavior inferences). This 
inference type effect did not interact reIiabIy with any theory efiects. 
Discussion 
In the present study, the direction of relationship between participants' current 
implicit theories and their confidence in social inferences is iargely consonant with 
Dweck and colleagues' general observation that expressed belief in an entity theory is 
associated with more confident social inferences. Results indicated that the more 
strongly participants believed the attributes used in the social inference questionnaire are 
fixed, the more confidence they exhibited in their social inferences. A much weaker 
trend in the sarne direction was also found between people's confidence and their theories 
regarding the rnalleability of personality in general. 
Note that studies by Dweck and colleagues using a sirnilar questionnaire format 
(Chiu et al., 1997; Studies 1 & 2) revealed a much stronger association between people's 
general person theory and confidence than that obtained in the present study. As 
mentioned earlier, the present study used many more personality attributes than was used 
by Dweck and colleagues. Conceivably, when faced with numerous inference items, 
each conceming a single attribute, our participants might have focused on distinguishing 
one attribute fiom another. Consequently, they might have been more inclined to draw 
upon their current beliefs about specific attributes rather than more general beliefs about 
people. This possibility might account for the present finding that the omnibus theory 
scores predicted participants' social inferences much better than did the general theory 
scores. 
As in our previous reseanih (see Part 1, this thesis), participants in the present 
study were more confident when basing their inferences on trait information than when 
basing their inferences on behaviorai information, regardless of their implicit beliefs. To 
the extent that people are dispositionists who regard traits as causes and behaviors as 
consequences (cf. L. Ross & Nisbett, 1991), this finding maps nicely ont0 Tversky and 
Kahneman's (1982) view that inferences fiom causes to consequences would be made 
with greater confidence than inferences in the reverse direction. The observation that 
trait-to-behavior inferences were made with greater confidence than were the behavior- 
to-trait inferences, in particular, is consistent with their treatment. 
Taken together, using a broad range of personality attributes and a measure that 
assessed people's specific beliefs about these particular attributes, the present study 
replicated the basic finding regarding the relationship between curent implicit theones 
held by different individuals and their confidence in social inferences as reported 
previously by Dweck and colleagues. In the next two studies, we used the sarne social 
inference questionnaire to examine how the relative accessibility of entity and 
incremental knowledge, which presumably CO-exist within the minds of individuals, 
influence their inferences. 
Study 2 
In a number of studies, Dweck and colleagues successfully manipulated people's 
implicit theones by presenting them with a fabncated "scientific" article that included 
persuasive arguments and cited evidence supporting either an entity or incremental theory 
(e.g., Chiu et al., 1997; Levy et al., 1998). Although this manipulation served well for 
these researchers' stated purpose of demonstrating a causal relationship between implicit 
beliefs and related inferences- it is not suitable for our present purpose. While the effect 
of this manipulation could be attributed to changes in the relative accessibility of 
participants' pre-existing entity versus incrementd knowledge. a highly plausible 
alternative interpretation cannot be ruled out. Conceivably, this persuasive manipulation 
could provide participants with a great deal of new knowledge and could compel them to 
endorse either the notion that personaiity is tixed or the contradictory notion that 
personality is malleable. In the present research, we sought to temporarily activate (or 
prime) participants' pre-existing entity or incremental knowledge without, if possible, 
persuading them to accept a designated conclusion on the issue of whether people's 
personality is fixed or malleable. 
In the present study, we primed participants' entity or incremental knowledge by 
exposing them to a biography of a fictitious character named "Max Hermann." In the 
entitv-prime condition, Hermann's personality was prototypicai of the notion that 
personality is fixed; his personality remained unchanged throughout his life (see 
Appendix A). ln the incremental-prime condition, Hermann's personality was 
prototypical of the notion that personaiity is maileable; his personality changed 
throughout his life (see Appendix B). Assurning that activation will spread fiom one 
piece of knowledge to other closely associated pieces (cf. Higgins, 1989), exposing 
participants to the entity biography was expected to increase the accessibility of their 
entity knowledge, whereas exposing them to the incremental biography would increase 
the accessibility of their incremental knowledge. To reinforce the manipulation, we also 
asked participants to explain why Hermann's personality remained unchanged (entity- 
prime condition), or why his personality changed (incremental-prime condition) over the 
course of his life. When trying to explain a certain event or a hypothesis, people tend to 
draw upon their existing repertoire of knowledge and select pieces of knowledge that fit 
well with the event or hypothesis to be expiained (cf. Koehler, 199 1). Hence, we 
reasoned that the explanation task would m e r  increase the accessibility of the targeted 
set of knowledge in each priming condition. After this priming task. participants 
proceeded to a second, ostensibly unrelated study, in which they made social inferences. 
It was hypothesized that participants in the entity-prime condition would make social 
inferences with greater confidence than would those in the incrementai-prime condition. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and four students of both genders fiom the University of Waterloo 
participated for partial credit in their Introductory Psychology class. Each experïmental 
session included between one and 10 participants. 
Procedure 
Priming manipulation. Participants were told that they would be completing two 
unrelated questionnaire studies during the same expenmentai session. Each 
questionnaire was given a separate study name and a separate consent form. The first 
questionnaire, which was used to produce the priming manipulation, was cdled a studv 
of readine. comprehension and exdanation. Participants were instnicted to read and 
answer questions about three passages. The first passage was on gardening, and the 
second one on cooking. These two passages were created to reinforce our cover story 
and conceal our intention of using the third passage, a two-page biography, as a prime. 
The biography described the life of a fictitious Nobel Prize wimer narned "Max 
Hermann". It detailed Max Hermann's achievements. the major milestones in his life 
(e-g., bom in Germany, attended university in Germany, and later settled in the U.S.). as 
well as descriptions of his personality at various stages of his life. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the two priming conditions. In the entity-prime condition, 
Hermann was portrayed as unchanging throughout his life. He was generally described 
as introverted and analytical fiom childhood through aduithood to old age. In the 
incremental-prime condition, temporal changes in Hermann's personality were 
emphasized. He was first described as an uncouth youth, then as a single-minded, 
introverted scientist during adulthood, and finalIy as an outgoing, generous old man 
concerned with spiritual issues. In both conditions, participants were asked to summarize 
and then to answer a question about the biography. In the entity-prime condition, 
participants were asked, "It has been noted that Hermann's personality has remained 
unchanged throughout his life. Explain why". In the incremental-prime condition, 
participants were asked, "It has been noted that Hermann's personality has changed a lot 
throughout his life. Explain why". The biographies did not directly explain why 
Hermann remained unchanged or why he changed a lot, and participants were explicitly 
instnicted to use their own knowledge or common sense in providing explanations. We 
did, however, alIow participants to make use of any materials contained in the 
biographies. This part of the expenmental session took about 30 minutes to complete. 
Social inferences and belief ratinns. Afier completing the study on reading 
comprehension and explmation, participants proceeded to a social iudpment studv. 
Participants were asked to complete the social inference questionnaire used in Study 1. 
To assess the impact of the priming manipulation on their beliefs about the malleability 
of personality. we then administered a bnef questionnaire entitled "W'hat have you found 
to be tnie of people in general?" In this questionnaire, participants were asked to rate 
people in general dong a number of dimensions, such as haoov-unha~m 
untnistworthv-tmsnirorth~, and rationai-irrational. We embedded the crucial question. 
"Do you think people's personality traits can or cannot change?'' in the middle of the 
questionnaire. Participants were asked to circle a number representing their view on a 
9-point scde (1 = can alwavs change, 9 = cannot change). 
Towards the end of the experimental session, participants were asked to write 
down any ideas they had about the purpose of the expenmental session. None of them 
reported any suspicion that the biography was relevant to the questionnaires administered 
following the explanation task. Participants were hl ly debriefed. 
Results 
Probabilitv Judments in the Social Inference Questionnaire 
As in Study 1, for each participant, we computed four composite judgment scores 
by averaging his or her probability judgments for al1 30 items within each of the four 
types of inferences in the social inference questionnaire. Participants' composite 
judgment scores were then submitted to a 2 (priming: entity vs. incremental) X 4 
(inference type: behavior-to-trait, trait-to-behavior, behavior-to-behavior, and trait-to- 
trait) mixed ANOVA with the second factor varied within participants. Table 2.3 
displays the means for this analysis as a function of the two factors. This analysis 
revealed a significant main effect of priming, F (1, 102) = 7.35, MSE = 21 2.47, p < .O 1, 
9 The wording of this particular item closely follows that of the implicit theory manipulation check used by 
Levy et al. ( 1998). 
indicating that participants who received the entity prime generally made more confident 
inferences than did those who received the incremental prime (Ms = 7 1 -44 vs. 67.56). 
The main effect of inference type was also statistically reliable, (3, 306) = 39.82. MSE 
= 63.89, p c -00 1. Consistent with Study 1, participants were generally more confident 
when basing their inferences on trait information (M = 76.29 for trait-to-behavior 
inferences; M = 69.76 for trait-to-trait inferences) than when basing their inferences on 
behavioral information (M = 67.08 for behavior-to-trait inferences; M = 64.87 for 
behavior-to-behavior inferences). The Priming X lnference Type interaction did not 
reach significance, (3, 306) = -35, MSE = 63.89. indicating that the effect of priming 
was similar across inference types. 
------- Insert Table 2.3 about here------- 
Belief Ratings 
We examined the effect of prirning on participants' responses to the item, "Do 
you think that people's personality traits can or cannot change?" (1 = can alwavs charne, 
9 = cannot change), using a one-way ANOVA. This analysis showed that the priming 
manipulation had a significant effect on people's belief ratings, F (1, 102) = 7.83, MSE = 
2.7 1, p < -0 1. Participants who received the incremental prime more strongly endorsed 
the notion that people's personality traits can change (M = 3.33) than did participants 
who received the entity prime (M = 4.23). 
Within each priming condition, participants' belief ratings did not reliably 
correlate with their overall probability judgrnents (r = - .O7 in the entity-prime condition; 
r = .18 in the incremental-prime condition). At the same time, the aforementioned main - 
effect of priming on probability judgments remained significant when the belief ratings 
were included as a covariate. Thus, the eflect of the priming manipulation on 
participants' j udpen t s  did not appear to be mediated by their post-priming beliefs 
regarding the maileability of personality attributes, at least to the extent that such beliefs 
could be properly assessed by this one-item belief measure. 
Content of Open-ended Explmations 
The priming manipulation was intended to activate knowledge regarding either 
the stability or the malleability of penonality attributes. Having established the priming 
manipulation's effect on subsequent social inferences, the content of the explanations 
generated in response to the two priming conditions was analyzed to confirm that the 
manipulation did in fact produce explanations that focused differentially on either stable 
personality differences or on the malleability of personality across time and situations. In 
short, this analysis tests whether the priming manipulation indeed infiuenced the extent to 
which participants used or made reference to knowledge relevant to an incremental 
versus an entity theory of personality. 
Coding. scheme. Dweck and colleagues have distinguished three categones of 
social information that people may use in explaining social behavior or outcomes. They 
are: (1) trait-focused information, which includes personality traits and such context-free 
dispositions as intelligence and morality; (2) process-focused information, which Dweck 
and colleagues define as specific psychological mechanisms that mediate behavior or 
outcomes, such as context-sensitive goals, construais and mood states; and (3) situational 
factors that affect a person's behavior. Dweck and colleagues found that, relative to 
incremental theorists, entity theorists tend to focus more on traits, and less on 
psychological processes and situational forces. when trying to explain social behavior 
(Levy & Dweck, 1999; see also Levy & Dweck, 1998: Levy et al., 1999). 
Accordingly, we analyzed the content of our participants' explanations in terms of 
the relative weights they accorded to trait-focused information, process-focused 
information, and situational factors. For coding purposes, al1 responses were segmented 
into n i t s  corresponding to each clause.'0 irrelevant units were then identified. 
Reiterations of the explanation question, personal reactions to the passage which were 
clearly unrelated to the explanation question, as well as units that did not fit into any of 
the three social information categories were classified as irrelevant. The remaining units 
were regarded as relevant. Following this extraction process, two raters were given 
transcriptions of participants' entire responses with units demarcated and numbered, in 
addition to coding sheets with corresponding numbers (cf. Morris & Peng, 1994). 
Relevant units were indicated on the coding sheets. The two raters independently coded 
each relevant unit as falling into one of the three-social information categones. Across 
the two priming conditions, there were 439 relevant units. Both raten were blind to the 
experimental conditions associated with responses. ' ' Exarnples of each category of 
social information appear in Table 2.4. The inter-rater reliability of the coding, as 
'O We chose to break down each of our participant's response into smaller units for coding purposes 
because in many cases, while part of a response would clearly fit into one category, another part might well 
be coded into another category. Thus, this coding method is slightly different fiom that used by Levy and 
Dweck (1999), who coded each participant's entire open-ended explanation into a given category. Note 
that in their study, participants were chilcûen, whose responses are likely to be less complex, relative'to our 
undergraduate sample. 
" While the raters were not shown the experimental conditions associated with the explanations, 
participants' responses in the two conditions differed so markedly chat the raters might well distinguish two 
major classes of responses, one class explaining why Hermann remained unchanged and another explaining 
the changes in his personality. 
calculated by Cohen's kappa was acceptable (-70). The proportion of inter-rater 
agreement, before Cohen's correction for chance, was -80. 
------- Insert Table 2.4 about here----- 
Differences in social information focus across ~riming; conditions. For each 
participant. the number of units coded into each of the three social information categories 
was tallied fiom each rater's coding. To give each rater's coding equal weight, for each 
participant, we simply averaged the fiequency counts of each category of social 
information fiom the two raters. We submitted the averaged frequencies to a 2 (priming: 
entity vs. incremental) X 3 (information category: trait-focused, process-focused and 
situational) mixed ANOVA, with the second factor varied within participants. Table 2.5 
displays the relevant mean fiequencies as a fiinction of the two factors. This analysis 
yielded a significant main effect of information category, F (2,204) = 4.05, MSE = 2.30, 
< .OS. Collapsed across priming conditions, participants focused more on traits (M = 
1.75) than on psychological processes (M = 1.27) or situations (M = 1.20) in their 
explanations. The main effect of priming condition was marginally significant, F (1, 102) 
= 2.99, MSE = 1.98, e < .l . Overall, participants' explanations in the incremental-prime 
condition &l= 4.63) comprised slightly more relevant units than did those in the entity- 
prime condition (M = 3 -8 1). More importantly, these two main effects were qualified by 
a significant Pnming X Information Category interaction, F (2,204) = 49.92, MSE = 
2.30, E < -001 .12 This interaction effect indicates that relative to the participants in the 
entity-prime condition, those in the incremental-prime condition focused less on traits U 
" This effect remained significant even when participants' belief ratings was used as a CO-variate. 
71 
(1 02) = -7.38, p < -00 11 but more on psychological processes [! ( 102) = 6.43. p < -00 11 
and situational factors (102) = 3.70, Q < .O011 (see Table 2.5). 
------ Insert Table 2.5 about here------- 
Discussion 
As predicted, we found that participants exhibited greater confidence in their 
social inferences when their entity knowledge was primed than when their incremental 
knowledge was primed. This finding is consistent with the idea that people possess both 
knowledge consistent with an entity theory and knowledge consistent with an incrementd 
theory. and that the relative accessibility of these two sets of pre-existing knowledge is a 
key factor moderating the influence of such knowledge on social inferences. 
Another noteworthy finding is that our priming manipulation had a reliable effect 
on participants' belief regarding the malleability of personality traits. After receiving an 
incremental prime, participants expressed a stronger belief that personality traits c m  
change than after receiving an entity prime. This finding suggests that the temporal 
instability of people's implicit beliefs could be produced by changes in the relative 
accessibility of entity versus incrementai knowledge over time. 
Participants' post-priming belief ratings did not correlate with their confidence in 
inferences within each pnming condition, even though our priming manipulation had an 
effect on both social inferences and belief ratings. The distinction we made between 
people's knowledge and beliefs about the malleability of personality might help explicate 
this pattern of results. Both social inferences and belief ratings could be considered as 
social judgrnents that were subject to direct influence by relevant pieces of accessible 
knowledge. When making inferences, our participants might rely on whatever entity and 
incremental knowledge happens to be accessible, without considering or relying on the 
extent to which they believed in the general notion that personality is fixed or the notion 
that personality is malleable. Such a tendency to rely on readily accessible knowledge 
might be Oriven in part by a high need for closure situationally induced by the pressure to 
complete several questionnaries within a reasonable time h e  in group settings (cf. 
Kniglanski, 1990; see aiso Chiu, Morris, Hong & Menon, 2000). 
A caveat of the foregoing interpretation is in order. It is possible that the 
correlation between belief ratings and probability judgrnents was non-significant within 
priming conditions simply because the one-item belief measure did not adequately 
capture participants' beliefs about the malleability of the specific personality attributes 
evaluated in the social inference questionnaire. This account would be analogous to our 
earlier suggestion that the general theory measure fared less well as a predictor of 
people's confidence than the omnibus theory measure because the generd measure did 
not adequately cover the specific personality attributes used in the social inference task. 
An analysis of the content of participants' open-ended explanations in response to 
the priming task suggests that the manipulation had the intended effect of drawing 
attention to either entity or incremental knowledge . Although such responses might not 
fûlly represent al1 pieces of knowledge activated by our priming procedure, our content 
analysis did serve to reveai the kinds of social-personality knowledge that they 
spontaneously used when trying to make sense of the biographical sketch of Max 
Hermann. When explaining why Hermann remained unchanged, an outcome 
prototypical of the notion that personality is fixed, participants appeared to think like trait 
theonsts (e-g., Costa Bc McCrae, 1994), focusing on traits rather than on psychological 
processes and situational forces. When explaining why Hermann's personality changeci. 
an outcome prototypical of the notion that personality is malleable. participants seemed 
to think like social-cognitive theorists ( e g ,  Cervone, Shadel & Jencius, 200 1 ; Mischel, 
1999: Shoda, 1999), focusing more on psychological processes and situationai factors 
than personality traits or other dispositions. As noted earlier, Dweck and colleagues 
found that relative to incremental theorists, entity theonsts tend to focus more on traits 
and less on psychologicai processes and situational information when making attributions 
for social behaviors or outcomes (Levy & Dweck, 1999). The present study extended 
their finding by showing that the relative weights that people accord to traits. 
psychologicai processes and situation factors in interpreting social outcomes may also 
vary as a function of changes in knowledge accessibility within an individual. The same 
priming manipulation that produced apparent differences in the relative accessibility of 
knowledge about traits, psychological processes and situational forces also infiuenced the 
confidence with which participants made social inferences. This result is consistent with 
suggestions of previous researchers (e-g., Trope & Gaunt, 2000) that activation of 
knowledge about situational forces can attenuate people's tendency to infer dispositions 
fiom behavior. 
Study 3 
As described above, out goal in the present research was to prime participants' 
pre-existing entity and incremental knowledge without persuading thern to accept a 
designated conclusion regarding whether people's personality is fixed or malleable. To 
this end, in Study 2, we exposed participants to a biography of a fictitious character 
named "Max Hermann'', whose personality was either prototypical of the notion that 
personality is fixed or of the notion that personality is malleable. This manipulation was 
non-persuasive; in no way were participants compelled to generalize from this single case 
to people in general on the issue of whether personality c m  change. However, in 
documenting Hermann's personality, the biographies did present our participants with 
new data regarding the nature of human attributes. The present study was designed to 
complement Study 2 by using a priming procedure that minimized the amount of 
information to be presented participants and more fùlly capitalized on their pre-existing 
knowledge. 
In the present study, we chose to use a task in which participants described the 
meaning of various proverbs as the basis for our pnming manipulation. Proverbs have 
been used by other researchers to prime people's existing knowledge (e.g., Trope & 
Gaunt. 2000). Proverbs can serve as primes because interpretations of these short, pithy 
sayings often appeal to the pieces of folklonstic or experiential knowledge that they 
embody. As a priming task, participants in the present study were asked to evaluate the 
meaning of proverbs consistent with the notion that personality is fixed (entity-prime 
condition) or with the notion that personality is malleable (incremental-prime condition). 
On the assurnption that activation will spread over pieces of knowledge that are closely 
associated (cf. Higgins, 1996), participants' entity knowledge should be more accessible 
in the entity-prime condition, whereas their incremental knowledge should be more 
accessible in the incremental-prime condition. After the priming task, participants 
proceeded to a second, allegedly unrelated study, in which they made social inferences. 
As in Study 2, we hypothesized that participants in the entity-prime condition would 




One hundred and eleven undergraduates of both genders fiom the University of 
Waterloo participated in exchange for partial credit in their Introductory Psychology 
class. Each.experimenta1 session included between one and 10 participants. 
Procedure . 
Primina mani~ulation. Participants were told that they would be participatine in 
two unrelated questionnaire studies during the same expriment session. Each 
questionnaire was given a separate study name and a separate consent form. First, they 
participated in a studv of proverbs in evervday life. In this part, their task was to answer 
questions about three proverbs. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two 
priming conditions. In the entity-prime condition, the proverbs pertained to the notion 
that personality is fixed (i.e., "YOU cannot teach an old dog new tricks"; "Old habits die 
hard"; "A leopard cannot change its spots"). In the incremental-prime condition, the 
proverbs pertained to the notion that personality is malleable (i.e., "It is never too late to 
learn"; "Experience is the best teacher"; "When in Rome, do as the Romans do"). For 
each proverb, participants were first asked to rate their farniliarity with its meaning on a 
6-point scale ( 1 = not at al1 familiar; 6 = vew f m i l i b .  Then, in an open-ended format. 
they were asked to explain its common meaning and describe three situations to which 
the proverb could be applied. Next, they were asked to indicate the initials of the first 
person who cornes to mind when thinking about the proverb, and to describe how that 
person exempiifies the meaning of the proverb. This part of the experimental session 
lasted about 30 minutes. 
Sociai inferences and belief ratines. After fuiishing the study on proverbs, 
participants proceeded to a social iudment studv, in which they completed the social 
inference questionnaire used in Studies 1 and 2. To determine whether they interpreted 
the probability rating scaie as instructed, we also included two forced-choice questions at 
the end of the questionnaire in the present study. Recall that participants were asked to. 
judge the probability that Person A would exhibit more of a certain trait or behavior than 
wouid Person B. The first question was, "In making your judgments, how did you 
interpret the 0% and 100% endpoints of the scale?" Participants were asked to circle one 
of the following: "(a) 1 00% meant that Person A would certain1 y exhibit more of the trait 
or behavior than Person B; 0% meant that Person B would certainly exhibit more of the 
trait or behavior than Person A ,  or "(b) 100% meant that Person A was definitely more 
likely than Person B to exhibit the trait or behavior; 0% meant that Person A was no more 
or less likely than Person B to exhibit the trait or behavior". A choice of (a) would 
indicate correct (Le., consistent with our intended meaning) interpretations of the two 
endpoints of the rating scaie. A choice of (b) would indicate correct interpretation of the 
100% rating but misinterpretation of the 0% rating. The second question was, "In 
making your judgments, how did you interpret a rating of 50%?" Participants were asked 
to choose one of the following: "(a) Person A and Person B had an about equal chance of 
being the person exhibiting more of the trait or behavioi', or "(b) Penon A was 
somewhat more likely than Person B of being the person exhibiting more of the trait or 
behavior'?. A choice of (a) woutd indicate correct interpretation of the 50% rating, where 
as a choice of (b) would indicate misinterpretation of the 50% rating. 
As in S tudy 2, we adrninistered a brief questionnaire entitled " M a t  have you 
found to be true of people in general?" following the inference task. Embedded in this 
questionnaire was the crucial question, "Do you think people's personality traits can or 
cannot change?" (1 = can alwavs chanee, 9 = cannot chanee). Finally, participants were 
asked to write down any ideas they had about the purpose of the experimentai session. 
Two participants who were suspicious of the link between different parts of the 
experimental session were excluded fiom data analyses. Also excluded were one 
participant who reported having heard about the present study, and another one who 
reported feeling very annoyed about the experirnental session. Four additional 
participants were excluded because they misinterpreted a rating of 50% (i.e., failed the 
second question about the rating scale), leaving a total of 103 participants in the 
following data analyses. l 3  
Results 
If We did not exclude 24 participants who only misinterpreted the 0% rating (Le., the group who only failed 
the first question about the rating scale). This group of participan.& did not .deviate from the group who 
passed both questions about the rating scale in terms of the range of values they used in the probability 
scale; for both groups, their probability judgements typicaily fell between 50% and 100%. It appeared that, 
in the present research, as long as participants could identiQ 50% as the point which indicates they could 
not make inferences with any confidence given the information provided, how they interpreted the 0% 
rating did not have a big impact on the way they responded to the inference items. In fact, similar results 
were obtained whether or not the 24 participants were included in the analyses. We did, however, exclude 
four participants who misinterpreted the 50% rating (Le., failed the second question about the rating scale), 
as misinterpretation of this point seemed to be associated with a markedly different pattern of responding. 
Most notably, compared to the group of 24 participants who only misinterpreted the 0% rating and the 
remaining participants who passed both questions about the rating scale, these four participants used ratings 
below 50% fairly fiequently. These four participants might in fact have treated 0% instead of 50% as the 
point indicating that they could not make an inference with any confidence. As we did not ask participants 
how they interpreted the 50% rating in Studies 1 and 2, we could only assume that, as in the present study, 
rnisinterpretation of the 50% rating occurred infiequently, and presumably about equaIly often across 
experimental conditions. 
Familiaritv with Proverbs 
For each participant, the farniliarity ratings for the three proverbs in his or her 
priming condition were averaged to give an overall familiarity score. Participants in the 
entity- and incremental-prime conditions did not differ on their overall familiarity scores, 
f (1 0 1) = - 1  8, m. In general, the rneaning of the proverbs in both priming conditions were 
familiar to participants (M = 4.5 1 for the entity-prime condition; M = 4.47 for the 
incrernental-prime condition; 1 = not at al1 familiar, 6 = verv familiar). 
Probabilitv Judanents in the Social Inference Questionnaire 
As was done in the previous studies, four composite judgment scores were 
computed for each participant by averaging his or her probability judgments for al1 30 
items within each of the four inference types in the social Merence questionnaire. 
Participants7 composite judgment scores were subjected to a 2 @riming: entity vs. 
incremental) X 4 (inference type: behavior-to-trait, trait-to-behavior, behavior-to- 
behavior, and trait-to-trait) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the latter factor. 
Table 2.6 presents the means of this analysis as a function of the two factors. There was 
a significant main effect of the priming manipulation, E (1, 10 1) = 6.24, MSE = 254.39, p 
< .OS. Similar to Study 2, participants in the entity-prime condition generally exhibited 
greater confidence in their social inferences than did those in the incremental prime 
condition (Ms = 70.02 vs. 66.1 0). The mixed ANOVA aiso revealed a significant main 
effect of inference type, F (3,303) = 44.49, MSE = 40.41, < -001. As in the previous 
studies, participants were generally more confident when basing their inferences on trait 
information (M = 73.80 for trait-to-behavior inferences; M = 68.45 for trait-to-trait 
inferences) than when basing their inferences on behavioral idormation (M = 64.46 for 
behavior-to-trait inferences; M = 65.53 for behavior-to-behavior inferences). The 
Pnming X Inference Type interaction was not statisticdly reliable. F (3, 303) = .O 1. MSE 
= 40.41, indicating that the effect of priming did not differ across inference types. 
------- Insert Table 2.6 about here------- 
Belief ratinas 
To examine the effect of priming on participants' responses to the belief-rating 
item, "Do you think that people's personality traits c m  or cannot change?" (1  = cari 
always change, 9 = cannot change), we conducted a one-way ANOVA. This analysis 
reveaied that priming had a signficant effect on belief ratings, F (1, 101) = 7.85, MSE = 
3.34, p 4 .O 1. Participants who received the incremental pnme (hJ = 3.48) expressed a 
stronger belief that people's personality traits can change than did those who received the 
entity prime (M = 4.49). 
Wiüiin each priming condition, as in the previous experiment, participants' belief 
ratings did not significantly correlate with their overall probability judgments (L = .O6 in 
the entity-prime condition; E = .20 in the incremental-prime condition). Also, the effect 
of priming on the probability judgments remained significant when participants' belief 
ratings were used as a covariate. Hence, the effect of priming on participants' judgments 
did not seem be mediated by their post-priming expressed beliefs about the malleability 
of personality amibutes, at least to the extent that such beliefs are adequately assessed in 
this one-item belief measure. 
Discussion 
The use of proverbs as primes in this study minirnized the amount of information 
presented to participants, and at the same time required participants to draw heavily upon 
their own knowledge in answenng the questions about the proverbs. Their familiarity 
ratings indicated that they were familiar with the meaning of prcverbs in both pnming 
conditions. Not surprisingly, we found that mon participants were able to explain the 
meaning of proverbs, give examples of the situations to which the proverbs can be 
applied, and provide illustrations using their experiences £iom people they know. ïhese 
observations validate our assumption that most people possess knowledge consistent with 
the notion tbat penonality is fixed and also consistent with the conîradictory notion that 
personality is malleable* 
Despite the difference in the pnming manipulation, the major findings in Study 2 
were replicated in the present study. Participants who received an entity prime made 
social inferences with greater confidence than did those who received an incremental 
prime. In addition, participants in the entity-prime condition endorsed the notion that 
personality can change to a lesser extent than did those in the incremental-prime 
condition. Taken together, the results fiom Studies 2 and 3 are compatible with Our 
proposal that the relative accessibility of entity versus incremental knowledge is a crucial 
determinant as to which set of knowledge is likely to guide social inferences at a 
particular moment. Moreover, the results also suggest that changes in knowledge 
accessibility can have an impact on people's expressed beliefs about the malleability of 
penonality . 
Generai Discussion 
We began by noting that temporal instability in people's implicit theones about 
the malleability of personality limits the usefûlness of an individual-differences approach 
in studying the link between implicit theories and social inferences. We reasoned that a 
knowledge-activation perspective holds some promise in illurninating the social-cognitive 
processes underlying intra-individual variations in knowledge accessibility. The current 
work set out to use a knowledge-activation perspective to understand how people's 
knowledge about the malleability of personality influences their social inferences. 
Study 1 showed that people's current irnplicit beliefs are related to how they make 
several kinds of social inferences. Generally consistent with previous research (Chiu et 
al., 1997), participants who believed more strongly in the fixedness of the specific 
personality attributes involved in Our social inference questionnaire (entity theorists) 
exhibited greater confidence in their inferences than those who believed in the 
malleability of these attributes (incremental theorists). A similar, yet much weaker trend 
was also observed between people's beliefs about the malleability of personality in 
general and their confidence in making social inferences (Study 1). 
In Studies 2 and 3, we evaluated implications denved fiom a knowledge- 
activation framework. Assuming that most people possess some knowledge consistent 
with the notion that personality is fixed (entity knowledge) and with the contradictory 
notion that personality is malleable (incremental knowledge), we tested the hypothesis 
that people's social inferences are guided by the currently more accessible set of 
knowledge. Across the two studies, we experimentally manipulated the relative 
accessibility of participants' pre-existing entity versus incremental knowledge. Parallel 
to previous studies (including Study 1) demonstrating greater confidence in entity than 
incremental theorists' inferences, we found that participants whose entity knowledge was 
pnmed subsequently made inferences with greater confidence than did participants whose 
incremental knowledge was primed. While this finding is not amendable to an 
explanation fiom an individuai-differences standpoint, it is readily interpretable within a 
knowledge-activation perspective. This finding is compatible with the idea that rnost 
people possess entity and incremenfal knowledge, and that temporary accessibility is a 
factor moderating the relative influence of the two sets of knowledge on social inferences 
made by a given individual at a particular time. 
The finding that the two different priming manipulations (Studies 2 and 3) yielded 
similar results also serves to shed light on how knowledge about the malleability of 
personality is organized. These manipulations involved different priming stimuli 
(biographies in Study 2, proverbs in Study 3), and could be seen as Ieading participants to 
use slightly different aspects of their entity or incremental knowledge. Specifically, in 
Study 2, when trying to explain why the personality of a fictitious character remained 
unchanged or changed throughout his life, participants might be prone to use their causal 
schemas. In Study 3, when explaining the meaning of proverbs, they rnight use their 
semantic memory; when illustrating the meaning of proverbs using their everyday 
experience, they might draw upon their episodic mernory. Despite these potentially 
important differences, the effectiveness of both manipulations required that activation 
spread over closely associated pieces of knowledge; that is, the entity prime is assumed to 
activate the packet of entity knowledge and the incremental prime the packet of 
incremental knowledge. The finding that the two studies yielded similar results is 
consistent with the view that pieces of knowledge about the malleability of personality 
form two distinct knowledge structures, one surrounding the notion of fixedness and 
another the notion of malleability (cf. Levy et ai., 1999). 
Results fiom the current investigation also permit us to speculate on the 
mechanisms underlying the instability in an individual's implicit beliefs across time, as 
documented in Our previous studies (see Part 1: this thesis). Based on the finding that 
changes in the relative accessibility of entity and incremental knowledge affected 
participants' beliefs about the malleability of personality (Studies 2 and 3), we posit that 
changes in knowledge accessibility may contribute to temporal instability in an 
individual's implicit beliefs. Changes in the relative accessibility of entity and 
incremental knowledge could be brought about by changes in the relative fiequency with 
which the two sets of knowledge are activated over an extended period of time or by 
recent activation of one set of knowledge over another (cf. Higgins, 1996). 
Together, the current work illustrates the value of using a knowledge-activation 
perspective to understand how people's lay knowledge regarding the malleability of 
personality influences their social inferences. In particular, this work shows how pieces 
of pre-existing entity and incremental knowledge can shift in their relative accessibility in 
the mind of an individual and become operative in guiding the individual's uiferences. 
While the present knowledge-activation frarnework has the capaci ty of capturing intra- 
individual variations in knowledge accessibility left unexplained by an individual- 
differences approach, individuai differences in knowledge states can be accommodated 
within a knowledge-activation framework. As noted in the Introduction, even though 
people's implicit theories exhibit temporal instability, there is also a certain degree of 
stability. Such stability in implicit beliefs rnight be viewed as reflecting, at least in part, 
chronic (or baseline) individual differences in the accessibility of entity versus 
incremental knowledge (cf. Levy et al., 1 999). 
Research on the link between people's lay knowledge about the malleability of 
personality and social inferences can continue to benefit by importhg insights 
accumulated in the sociai cognition literature. The emphasis of the current work was on 
temporary accessibility of people's entity and incremental knowledge. More precise 
understanding of how such knowledge impacts social inferences c m  be reached by 
exploring other factors known to govem the activation and use of pre-existing knowledge 
structures including cultural knowledge, trait constructs, and stereotypes (see, e.g., Chiu 
et al., 2000; Higgins, 1996; Kunda & Sinclair, 1999). 
The current investigation is somewhat nanow in scope in that it focused 
exclusively on people's knowledge about personality and their social inferences. By 
cornparison, Dweck and colleagues' work on implicit theories about the malleability of 
human attributes is much broader in scope. Their work spans the domains of personality, 
intelligence and morality . A wide array of cognitive, emotional, motivational, and 
behavioral correlates have been found in each of these domains (Dweck et al., 1995a). It 
would be interesting to examine in future research whether a knowledge-activation 
framework can be miitfully applied to different domains and be used to understand a 
wider variety of psychological phenomena. 
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Table 1 .1 
Results of Criterion-scaled Hierarchical Remession Analvses of Probability Judgments 
[Part 1. Studv 1) 
Source - df - F
Between subjects 
Theory 1 O. 04 
S - 76 (1657.13) 
Within subjects 
Similarity 
Similarity X Theory 
Similarity X S 4600 (254. 96) 
Note. Variables were curnulatively entered in the order listed. Al1 subject-related 
variables were criterion-scded variables serving as error terms. Values enclosed in 
parentheses represent mean square errors. S = subjects within groups. 
Table 1.2 
Examde Items for Each Level of Similaritv bv Inference Twes (Part 1, Studv 2 )  
Inference type Example 
and similarity 
Behavior-to-trait 
Similar Person A behaved in a more likable way than Person B 
in a particular situation. 
What is the probability that Person A is more strongly 





Person A behaved in a more secretive way than Person B 
in a particular situation. 
What is the probability that Person A is more strongly 
characterized by the trait sympathetic than Person B? 
Person A behaved in a more active way than Person B in 
a particular situation. 
What is the probability that Person A is more strongly 
characterized by the trait shy than Person B? 
Person A is more strongly charactenzed by the trait 
likable than Person B. 
What is the probability that you would find Person A to 






Person A is more strongly characterized by the trait 
secretive than Person B. 
What is the probability that you would find Person A to 
behave in a more sympathetic way than Person B in a 
particular situation? 
Person A is more strongly characterized by the trait 
active than Person B. 
What is the probability that you would find Person A to 
behave in a more shy way than Person B in a particular 
situation? 
Behavior-to-Behavior 
Similar Person A behaved in a more likable way than Person B 
in a particular situation. 
What is the probability that in a completely different 
situation, you would find Person A to behave in a more 
warm way than Person B? 
Person A behaved in a more secretive way than Person B 
in a particular situation. 
What is the probability that in a completely different 
situation, you would find Person A to behave in a more 
sympathetic way than Person B? 
Person A behaved in a more active way than Person B in 
a particular situation. 
Unrelated 
Opposite 
What is the probability that in a completely different 
situation, you would find Person A to behave in a more 
shy way than Person B? 
Person A is more strongly charactenzed by the trait 
likable than Person B. 
What is the probability that Person A is more strongly 
characterized by the trait w a m  than Person B? 
Person A is more strongly characterized by the trait 
secretive than Person B. 
What is the probability b a t  Person A is more strongly 
characterized by the trait sympathetic than Person B? 
Person A is more strongly characterized by the trait 
active than Person B. 
What is the probability that Person A is more strongly 
characterized by the trait shy than Person B? 
Table 1.3 
Results of a Critenon-scaled Hierarchical Regression Analvsis of Composite Probability 
Judgsnent Scores {Part 1. Studv 2)  
Source - df - F
Between subjects 
Theory 1 O. 13 
S - 206 (244.69) 
Within subjects 
Merence 
Inference X Theory 
Inference X S 
Simi tari ty 
Similarity X Theory 
Similarity X S 412 (2 17.26) 
Inference X Similarity 6 15-82"' 
Inference X Similarity X Theory 6 1 .O9 
Inference X Similarity X S 1236 (15.3 1) 
Note. Variables were cumulativeIy entered in the order listed. AI1 subject-related - 
variables were criterion-scaled variables serving as error terms. Values enclosed in 
parentheses represent mean square errors. S = subjects within groups. 
Table 1.4 
Results of Criterion-scaled Hierarchical Regression Analyses of Com~osite Judment 
Scores Using. Different Measures of Impiicit Theones (Part 1. Studv 39 
Source 
generai general omnibus 




Theory X Similarity 1 0.66 7.24** 6.32** 
S - 199 (255.61) (21 1.58) (1 97.53) 
Within subjects 
Inference 
Inference X Theory 
Inference X Similarity 
Inference X Theory X Similarity 3 5.67*** 1 .O5 0.33 
Inference X S 597 (2 1.93) (22.35) (22.45) 
Note. Variables were cuxnulatively entered in the order listed. Al1 subject-related 
variables were criterion-scaled variables serving as error tenns. Values enclosed in 
parentheses represent mean square errors. S = subjects within groups. 
Table 1.5 
Percentages of Each Time-1 Theonst Cateeory Falling into Various Theonst Categories 
at Time-2 (Part 1. Studv 4) 
Time-2 










13 -7 24 -7 61 -6 
(10) (18) (45) 
27.3 18.2 54 -5 
(2 1) (14) (42) 
Note: Values in parenthesis represent frequency counts. Following Dweck et al. (1  999, 
for both the 8-item Theory Measure and its 3-item subset, participants with a theory score 
of 3.0 or below were classified as entity theorists, and those with a theory score of 4.0 or 
above as incremental theorists. 
Table 1.6 
Results of Hierarchicai Reaession Analyses of Composite Similaritv Judgment Scores 
using Different Measures of Im~licit Theories Part 1. Study 5 )  
F -
Source df 8-item general theory 3-item general theory 
Theory 1 -27 -20 
Similarity 1 175.40*** 175.68*** 
Theory X Similarity 1 -63 -73 
Error 98 (-19) (-19) 
Note. Variables were cumulatively entered in the order listed. Values enclosed in 
parentheses represent mean square errors. 
*** p < .O01 
Table 2.1 
An example item for each type of inference (Part II. Studv 1) 
Inference Type Example 
Behavior-to-trait Person A behaved in a more friendly way than Person B 
in a particular situation. 
What is the probability that Person A is more strongly 
characterized by the friendly than Person B? 
Trai t-to-behavior Person A is more strongly characterized by the trait 
friendly than Person B. 
What is the probability that you would find Person A to 
behave in a more friendly way than Person B in a 
particular situation? 
Behavior-to-behavior Person A behaved in a more friendly way than Penon B 
in a particular situation- 
What is the probability that in a completely different 
situation, you would find Person A to behave in a more 
friendly way than Person B? 
Presently, Person A is more strongly characterized by the 
trait friendly than Person B. -
What is the probability that Person A will be more 
strongly characterized by the trait friendly than Person B 
five years fiom now? 
Table 2.2 
Results of  Critenon-scaled Hierarchical Reaession Analvses of Com~osite Judgment - 
Scores Using Different Measures of  Im~licit Theones (Part II. Studv 1 )  




1 0.93 11.19** 
95 (369.1 1) (333.47) 
Inference 
Inkence X Theory 
Inference X S 
Within subjects 
3 36.82*** 37.23*** 
Note. Variables were curnulatively entered in the order listed. Values enclosed in 
parentheses represent mean square errors. S = subjects within groups. 
* * < p c . O l .  ***p<.001. 
Table 2.3 
Probabilitv Judgments as a Function of Priming and Inference Type (Part II, Study 2) 
Inference Type 
Priming Behavior-to- Trait-to- Behavior-to- Trait-to-trait 
trait behavior behavior 
Entity 69.58 77.16 67.55 7 1 -46 
Incremental 
Table 2.4 
Exampies of Trait-focused. Process-focused. and Situational information Used in 
Participants' Explmations in Each Priming Condition (Part II. Study 2) 
Social information category Example 
and priming condition 
Trait-focused 
Enti ty -prime ". . . because he was shy" 
Incremental-prime "Hermann changed from being an introvert to an 
extrovert ." 
Process-focused 
Entity -prime "Compieting his research and finding the truth 
obviously made Hermann happy" 
Incremental-prime ". . . because his goais changed" 
S ituational 
Entity-prime "His parents never really socialized him as a chiid." 
Incremental-prime "The environment around him changed fiom time to 
time." 
Table 2.5 
Frequencv of Use of Each Social Information Catenory in Open-ended Explanations for 
Each Prirning Condition (Part II. Studv 2) 
Social Information Category 
Trai t-focused Process-focused S ituational 
Entity 2.8 1 -3 6 -64 
Incremental -69 2.19 1.75 
Note: Nurnbers in table represent mean number of units coded into each information 
category per participant. 
Table 2.6 
Probability Judments as a Function of Priming. and Inference Twe (Part II. Studv 3) 
Priming 
In ference Type 
Behavior-to- Trait-to- Behavior-to- Trait-to-trait 
trait behavior behavior 
Entity 66.34 75.82 67.52 70.4 1 
Incremental 62.58 71.77 63 -54 66.48 
Figure 1 . l .  Probability judgments as a function of implicit theones and similarity of 
constnict pairs (Part 1, Study 1). 
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mean similarity rating 
Fimue 1.3. Probability judgrnents as a function of similarity between constructs and 
implicit theories (Part 1, Study 2). A lower person theory score reflects a stronger 
expressed belief in an entity theory. 
Time-1 General Theory Score 
- similar 
- - - unrelated - -0pposite 
-. - . - - . - -. - 
Figure 1.4. Probability judgments as a function of implicit theories assessed by three 
different rneasures (Part 1, Study 3). A lower person theory score reflects a stronger 
expressed belief in an entity theory. 
Time-l General Theory Scores 
- . . . - - - . - -  similar - - - unrelated 
.- - 
Tirne-2 General Theory Scores 
Figure 1.4 (continued). Probability judgments as a function of implicit theories assessed 
by three different measures (Part 1, Study 3). A lower person theory score reflects a 
stronger expressed belief in an entity theory. 
) . _ _ _ - - - - similar 
j - - - unrelated 
Time-2 Omnibus Theory Scores 
Fimire 1.5. Semantic similarity judgments as a function of similarity conditions and 
irnplicit theories (Part 1, Study 5 )  
8-item General Theory Scores 
, a - - - -  unretated 
-- ---- 
- -- --a A 
,  similar 
.--.- 
- -  - unrela ted - --- - -  
3-item General Theory Scores 
F i w e  2.1 Probability judgments as a fûnction of implicit theones assessed by the two 
different measures (Part II, Study 1). A lower theory score reflects a stronger belief in an 
entity theory. 
General Theory Scores 
Omnibus Theory Scores 
Appendix A 
Biography Used in the Entity-prime Condition (Part II, Study 2) 
The Life of M r x  Hermann 
The 2Uh rentuty har been dèrm'bed as 
an ama@rg centwy of rn'ence. By rome esftmter, 
about 80% of al/ the r&enf$c dummies eoer 
made in human hirloty occumd in the lass 100 
yearx As we embark on the new centu'y, 
B I O G W H Y  VEEKLY tvi/lpmjfe the 
/ive5 ofsome of the moxt outstanding rcientist~ in 
tbepast centmy. We be@ Mil, Ma*- Hermann 




Hermann's greatest achievemena lie in 
the fields of  physics and astronomy. He 
made fundamental contributions to the 
development of wave mechanics, for 
which he eventually received the Nobel 
Prize in Physics. He also invented an 
op tical system that revolutionized 
astronomy by significantly widening the 
field of vision of the largest telescopes 
that were used in his tirne. 
...................................... 
M ax Hennann was bom in Germany on September 12,1891. He 
grew up in an intelle&al family. Max's 
great-grandfather was Karl Hm- ,  a 
famous biologist; his grandfather, Richard 
Hermann, was a professor of 
mathematics; and bis father, Walter 
Hermann, had a doctorate in physics. 
Since his very eariy yean, Max Hermann 
had been an introvert; he liked to spend 
time alone rather than with others. He 
showed great interest in music as a young 
child and, long before he could speak, 
enjoyed sitting quietly as he listened to 
simple songs. His parents described him 
as an even-tempered child who never 
made a hss. He was generally regarded as 
a reserved, t hougha ,  and precouous 
child. Young Hermann lived a relatively 
conhned existence, watching the world 
outside from the Mndows and courtyard 
of his protected home. He had very few 
kends. 
At school, Hermann achieved very 
high grades. As one could expect, 
subjects like mathematics and physics 
were the strongest areas of this to-be- 
Nobel-Prize-winner in physics. In this 
teacher's view, Hermann was a 
hardworking student with exceptionally 
strong scholasac aptitude. He was also 
very well-behaved. In dass, he listened to 
his teachers with deep absorption and he 
never argued with them, even though he 
sometirnes secretly harbored the thought 
that his teachers could be wrong. 
Hermann had such a strong passion for 
science that he tumed his home into a 
laboratory. He read voraciously and 
patiendy conducted series of experiments 
at home. Indeed, he spent most of the 
meager dowance his father gave him on 
- 
equipment and supplies for his 
experirnents. By the age of 16, Hermann 
had designed and built windmills, pumps, 
and a unique device for measuring 
dis tances. 
In 191 0, Hermann graduated at 
the top of his high school dass. He won a 
scholarship to pursue his studies at the 
University of Berlin, where he studied 
physics. As an adult, he had much greater 
freedom. Yet he chose to continue to 
lead a quiet life. He remained an 
introvert; keeping to himself as much as 
possible, and spending most of his time 
on laboratory experiments. He continued 
to be fenrentlv iciterested in his academic 
pursuits, studping with seriousness and 
deep conviction. In short, Hermann was 
a weil-behaved, mode1 university student. 
His academic brilliance was lüily 
recognized, and bv 191 6 he had received 
his doctorate Erom the University of 
Berlin. 
Upon receiving his doctorate 
degree, Hemiann applied for and won a 
faculty position at the University of 
Munich. T'here, he began a quarter of a 
cenniry of experimentation and 
inventions. Despite his accompiis hrnents, 
Hermann's lifestyle did not change. As in 
his ctiildhood and adolescence, he was 
totally devoted to his work. The 
thoughtfd child grew up to be a 
thoughthil suentkt H e n n a ~  cons tantly 
questioned, revised and upgraded bis 
ideas, which he recorded in a little 
notebook that he always carried with him. 
As always, he worked patiently and 
detenninedly to reach his research goals 
through cumulative small s teps. 
Hermann's career reached its 
heights when he made s e v d  
fundamental contributions to the 
development of wave mechanics, for 
which he later received a Nobel Prke. In 
addition, he also invented an optical 
system that significantiy widened the field 
of vision of the largest telescopes in use at 
the time. Although Hermann was held in 
very high esteem in the scientific 
community, he had his critics. Hermann 
never argued with his teachea when he 
was a student; and he often did not 
respond to criticisms fiom others when he 
was a prominent suentist. Indeed, a 
number of his colleagues at the University 
of Munich described him as a ver). 
resemed man with a high level of 
emotional restraint. A man of few words, 
he c o n ~ u e d  with his work in solitude, 
letting the work speak for hirn. 
Throughout his career at Munich, he lived 
a very simple Me: he are sirnply, dressed 
sirnply, and lived in a very humble house. 
He remained unmarried, and had very few 
&ends. He never drank, 
In 1938, as Adolf Hitler gained 
increasing power in Germany, Hermann 
migrated to the US., where he accepted a 
position at New York University. Shortly 
after he had settled in New York, 
Hermann's health began to dedine. His 
hait: grew thin and his eyes obscured 
behïnd thick glasses. New York was a 
strange place to Hermann, but Hermann 
never changed. He conducted his life the 
same way as he did in Germany. He 
single-mindedly c o n ~ u e d  his quest for 
the "scientific truth" in America. By 
1942, he had established a physics library 
and a laboratory at New York University, 
where he sustained a productive reseacch 
career. He lived h@y. He did not have 
any persona1 interest beyond this research, 
except perhaps listening to music in the 
pnvacy of his modest apartment. 
Accordrng to some biographes, at New 
York University, a Young and beautiful 
professor named Caroline Pozzulo deeply 
admired his exceptional dents ,  and made 
several attempts to initiate a romantic 
relationship. Hermann, however, was not 
interested. Hermann remained 
unchangedruiet, detached, reswed,  
hardworhg and brilliant-und his death 
in 1971, at the age of 80. 
Appendix B 
Biography Used in the Incremental-prime Condition (Part II. Study 2) 
The Life of M à x  Hermann 
Tbe 2U' cenf-y bar been desm'bed ar 
an amaqirg centmy of xnknce. By ~omp esrimatex, 
a b o ~  80% of all the xkentgc ntrco~kx ewr 
made in buman bistory o c m d  in the h~t 100 
years. As we embark on the new centwy, 
BIOGRAPHY WEEKLY w11Ipmflfe the 
fives gxome of the mort outstanding Irientizts in 
rbepast cent-y. We begri wi/h Max Hmann 
and will/oilowjvm lime fo fime wirh pmJile.s Q I  
othwprvminent sn'entirjl- 
. . . . . . . , . 
ACHIEVEMENTS: Ma-u 
Hermann's greatest achievements lie in 
the fields of physics and astronomy. He 
made fundamental contributions to the 
development of wave mechanics, for 
which he eventually received the Nobel 
Prize in Physics. He also invented an 
optical system that revolutionited 
astronomy by signtticantly widenùig the 
field of vision of the largest telescopes 
that were used in his tirne. 
************************************** 
M ax Hermann was bom in Rottluff, a rural village in Germany on 
September 12,1891. He grew up as the 
only child in his family . His father 
worked in a smail shoe shop, and his 
mother was a daughter of a fanner. 
During his very eady years, he was an 
extrovert; he enjoyed spending t h e  with a 
gang of boys in his neighborhood rather 
than by himself alone. The guig often 
behaved wildly, doing thligs together like 
piling a family's porch himinire on the 
roof of the house just for fun. Hermann 
and his gang frequently involved in fights 
wi& boys from other parts of their dage ,  
ofien in dispute ocer a territory that they 
considered "theirs." 
At school, Hermann's grades were 
Iow, and ironicdy, subjects like 
mathematics and physics were among the 
weakest areas of this to-be-Nobel-Prize- 
winner in physics. Teachers chasased him 
for his hziness, and they thought that 
young Hemtann did not have the 
intellectual capacity to succeed in school, 
even if he tned bard. In his teachers' 
view, he was not ody  a mediocre student, 
but also a rebellious troublemaker. In 
elernentary school, he once set a snake 
loose in the dassroorn. Later on, in high 
school, he and his gang often skipped 
classes. Hennann was very outspoken. 
He debated with his teachers about such 
matters as what to Wear to school, and 
whether or not students were peanitted to 
eat d d g  dass. On a number of 
occasions, headmasters were cded on to 
sede  these controversies. 
In 1910, Hermann entered the 
University of Berlin, where he studied 
physics. He did not acnially attain high 
enough grades in bigh school to gain 
admission to this University. He was only 
admitted acadentally due to a derical 
enor. Upon entry to the University, 
Hermann changed dramatically. He 
becarne an uitmvert- Instead of enjoying 
hirnseif with others, Hermann kept to 
himself as much as possible. He cut off 
ail contact with his old gang. He becarne 
fervently interested in his academic 
pursuits, studying with seriousness and 
deep conviction. No longer was he a 
troublemaker. Hermann's academic 
brilliance was fully recognized, and by 
191 6 he had received a doctorate £rom the 
University of Berlin. 
Upon receMng his doctorate 
degree, Hermann applied and won a 
faculty position at the University of 
Munich. There, he began a quarter of a 
century of expesimentation and inventions 
at the University of Munich. The 
Mpulsiveness evident in his childhood 
and adolescence were totally gone. He 
worked patiently , and determinedly to 
reach his research goals thtough 
cumulative s m d  steps. He was an 
extremely re flective saentis t; he constantly 
questioned, revised and upgraded bis 
ideas, which he recorded in a Little 
notebook that he always canied with him. 
Hermann's career reached its 
heights when he made several 
fundamental conmbutions to the 
development of wave mechanics, for 
which he later received a Nobel Prize. In 
addition, he also invented an opacal 
system that significantly Mdened the field 
of vision of the largest telescopes in use at 
the tirne. Although Hermann was held in 
very high esteem in the scientific 
community, he bad his &tics. Unhke the 
young Hem- who had a passion for 
debate, the adult Hermann did not 
respond to criticisms. Indeed, a number 
of his colleagues at the UBiversiq of 
Munich described hun as a very reserved 
man with a high level of emotional 
restta.int. A man of a few words, he 
continued with his work in solitude, 
lettïng the work speak for him. 
Throughout his career at Munich, he lived 
a very simple life: he ate simply, dressed 
simply, and lived in a very humble house. 
He remained u~ltnarried, and had very few 
&ends. He never drank. 
In 1938, as Adolf Hitler gained 
iaueasing power in Germany, Hermann 
migrated to the US., where he accepted a 
position at New York Universitg. Shody 
afier he had settled in New York, 
Hermann's health began to decline. He 
began to re-evaluate how he should 
conduct the rest of his life in America. 
Hermann becarne less concerned uïith 
"suentific tnith", and more concerned 
with "spiritual truth". Hermann ceased to 
confine hirnself CO his home and 
laboratorv. Instead of investing in 
scientific research and inventions, 
Hermann directed his energy and time to 
religion and other endeavors thnt he 
thought wodd e ~ c h  his hfe. He 
attended diurch regulvly and he traveled 
auoss the continent to talk about the 
COM~CUOU between science and 
spirituality. He donated generously to 
charity and he did a great deal of 
volunteer work for the elderly. Through 
ail this work, he came into contact with 
people of very different backgrounds, and 
hiç social circle expanded significantly . In 
1946, at the age of 55, he marxïed Caroline 
Pozzulo, a young and beautiful woman he 
met through his church. The couple 
eventually had two ctiildxen. Hermann 
was a loving husband and father in his 
close-knit f d y .  Hermann passed away 
in his home in New York in 1971, at the 
age of 80, with h s  wife and children 
beside him. 
